

# COUNTERSpy

The Magazine For People Who Need To Know

Volume 5 Number 3

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May-July 1981

El Salvador White Paper ?

New Executive Order on CIA and FBI

The Washington Post - Speaking for Whom ?


U.S. Bases in Saudi Arabia

Who Wants Peace in Afghanistan ?

Turkey: Torture for NATO

Secret World Bank Plan for Indonesia

ASIO: Made in USA



# Editorial

In 1950, the National Security Council issued a directive (NSC-68) which said that "a free society is vulnerable in that it is easy for people to lapse into excesses - the excesses of a permanently open mind..." Taking the directive to heart, the CIA proceeded to penetrate and manipulate the media and academia to spare the American people from the danger of having open minds.

Now the CIA says that the NSC did not go far enough and that "it is the act of publishing (per se) without being reviewed [by the CIA] that is detrimental." As CIA censor Herbert E. Hetu put it, the CIA's problem is that: "We can't classify his [an author's] head." This brings us to HR4 and S391, entitled in Newspeak fashion; "Intelligence Identities Protection Act." These bills would make it illegal to publish information leading to the identification of intelligence officers and agents, even if the information has been derived entirely from public sources.

CounterSpy urges everyone to pressure Congress and the media to publicize and defeat these bills. For further assistance one may contact CounterSpy or the Campaign for Political Rights (201 Massachusetts Avenue N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002; tel. 202-547-4705).

Another serious assault on our rights is President Reagan's move to legalize more domestic CIA operations. The CIA might soon be allowed to conduct domestic counterintelligence operations against "foreign controlled suspected terrorists." If this sounds similar to Operation MHCHAOS, which began in the early 1960s, there is good reason. MHCHAOS was also defined as counterintelligence directed at finding foreign control over or just foreign inspiration of political dissent in the U.S. MHCHAOS operatives and even former CIA Director William Colby have admitted it was not counterintelligence but it was placed under counterintelligence because that is the most hidden component of the CIA.

MHCHAOS spied on hundreds of thousands of Americans but found no evidence of for-

eign control or even inspiration. By 1972, MHCHAOS was being severely criticized even by some CIA officers because it was in clear violation of the prohibition against domestic CIA operations. In response, CIA Director Richard Helms decreed that: "A clear priority is to be given in this general field to the subject of terrorism." More specifically, Helms said that MHCHAOS would not "be stopped simply because some members of the organization do not like this activity," and that "to a maximum extent possible" MHCHAOS director Richard Ober "should become identified with the subject of terrorism inside the Agency as well as in the Intelligence Community."

Within a few months, MHCHAOS (without changing its functions) became the International Terrorism Group (ITG) under Richard Ober. Same operation, new cover. In 1974 when MHCHAOS was formally terminated, the ITG continued under a former MHCHAOS officer; retained all of the MHCHAOS files on U.S. citizens; and continued receiving intelligence from the FBI and other governmental agencies. Ober went on to the National Security Council as a CIA employee and was involved with "terrorism" projects there.

The "unleashing" of the CIA and the FBI for counterintelligence operations in the U.S. against suspected "terrorists" is a hoax. Indeed, the CIA to this day has refused to give even the Miami police the names of rightwing Cubans - trained by the CIA in the use of firearms and explosives - who are terrorizing the residents of Miami. And, under then CIA Director George Bush, the CIA did not fully cooperate to solve the assassination of Ronnie Moffitt and Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C. at the hands of the Chilean secret police and CIA-trained rightwing Cubans.

The people in the U.S. must act quickly (particularly given former Undersecretary of State George Ball's public definition of striking workers as "paraterrorists") to stop Reagan's executive order from "unleashing" the FBI and CIA on us.

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## El Salvador White Paper? by Konrad Ege

*(Ed. note: Konrad Ege is an independent journalist. He has worked with CounterSpy for over two years.)*

In 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson used the Gulf of Tonkin "incident" as a pretext to justify bombing North Vietnam "back to the stone age." Today, the Reagan administration is using a much less sophisticated pretext for escalating U.S. military intervention in Central America: According to the State Department, El Salvador has become "a textbook case of indirect armed aggression by Communist powers." To back up these charges, the State Department released an inch-thick "White Paper" entitled "Communist Interference in El Salvador" to the press on February 23, 1981 which it claims reveals "a highly disturbing pattern of parallel and coordinated action by a number of Communist and some radical countries seeking to impose a military solution in a small, Third World country."

The documents printed in the White Paper are supposedly part of a larger set of documents captured from the guerrillas by Salvadoran soldiers. Some of the documents, according to Karen de Young in the Washington Post were seized in early November 1980. The rest were supposedly discovered by Jon Glassman, a Foreign Service officer who was sent to San Salvador on January 16, 1981. His mission was to "look into foreign intervention." At first, writes Young, Glassman wasn't too successful and, since he didn't find anything else to do, he "wandered around to various security force headquarters." And, according to "U.S. officials and diplomats in Mexico, Central America and Washington," this is when he found another set of guerrilla documents - over 18 pounds - which "Salvadoran soldiers... had blithely stacked... on an unused desk, assuming they were useless." The documents were brought to the U.S., and for two weeks, "a team of a dozen or more officials and secretaries worked to bring together the new documents and collate them with earlier intelligence." (Washington Post, 3/14/81)

The White Paper consists of 19 out of "over 80" captured documents and several *CounterSpy*, May-July 1981 - 3

photos of unexplained origin. It focuses on the role Salvadoran Communist Party leader Shafik Handal allegedly played in obtaining military support for the guerrilla movement from Socialist countries. Emphasis is placed on alleged Cuban and Nicaraguan aid to the guerrillas. A detailed study of the documents printed in the White Paper raises serious questions about their validity. Even if they were genuine, the documents do not prove the State Department's claims of massive Communist intervention.

Document B, for example, consists of two pages which are presented by the State Department as "Excerpts of notes on trip to Mexico by member of Political Commission of Salvadoran Communist Party... (dated April 26, 1980)." The original Spanish document consists of two undated handwritten pages which are translated as follows:

*(Begin Excerpt)*

*It is one thing or another -  
4th The Program: I agree with it, but  
could we have a different one ?*

*Memo: In the political analysis (word illegible), but the present moment requires us to move away from this into the coordination of our actions. In the international arena, not everything is favorable. We have to work on it. We have not gained everything.*

*Hector: Also in relation to that.*

*I: I took advantage of the opportunity to mention the (word illegible) in relation to the S.I. Hector said that the delay of the invitation sent to Santo Domingo was a result of administrative and not political problems. They talked about the advantage of mentioning everything to David.*

*Mayorga: I am at your service. If you ask me to be a street cleaner or a launderer.*

*Socialist Embassies.*

*Wide-ranging: German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Polish, Vietnam, Hungarians, Cuba, held at the Hungarian Embassy The meeting was a good one. A lot of questions.*

*He gave them the requests.*

*Then the bilateral meetings: One by one of (word illegible)*

*Vietnam: good*

*Bulgarians: good*

*Polish: We talked very much, 3 hours*

*Hungarian: Very interesting. Gloria start-*

*ed talking about the only P. (party) which they began with militarist inclinations and rejected the P.C. (Communist Party) The Hungarian replied: it is because of the P. (party) that the socialist world opens the door to you. It was a different case in Nicaragua. The last meeting was with the Soviet.*

*From the German Democratic Republic:  
Small souvenirs; operation - "Pan de Lata" - rocket/launchers*

*in addition to (word illegible)  
with CRM they want to agree on a party "Perl."*

*- also-files = NO*

*Fair (bazaar)*

*a) Manuel b) Diab and c) Juan Jose*

*Cassettes are need with the voices of the coordinating body (greetings or speeches) and with speeches of (word illegible) F.D. Handkerchiefs with the signature of the Directors of the Coordinating Body and Stamps Sent*

*5,000 key rings*

*Florencias*

*(End Excerpt)*

Obviously, even if this were a genuine document, the two pages say hardly anything other than that some people met with citizens of several Socialist countries.

Document C, introduced as "Excerpt from notes on meeting of Political Commission of Salvadoran Communist Party, April 28, 1980" likewise consists of two handwritten undated pages. It is obviously used in the White Paper because it mentions "possibilities of assistance from the socialist camp" and a suggestion that was made "to Fidel himself" about "involving everyone in the area." Otherwise, Document C is full of empty sentences with very little information, e.g., "We acted accordingly. I do not look behind, rather, I look ahead with boldness. On the basis of this panorama, we should tackle the problems which are: - focus on the main tasks without losing sight of them. - Main tasks: Make adjustments in the Party to carry out the struggle..."

Document D ("Report on trip of 'Eduardo' (member of Political Commission of Salvadoran Communist Party) from May 5 to June 8, 1980") is comprised of three typed pages. Most likely, it was not written with a Spanish model typewriter since all

the accents are marked in by hand. (This is true for most - probably all - type-written Spanish documents, even the ones supposedly written inside El Salvador, but in some cases the reprints are too bad to tell.) Document D also refers to "Milicos" which is translated by the State Department as "members of the armed forces." However, "Milicos" is a term unlikely to be used by a Salvadoran. Salvadorans use "chafarotes" as a slang expression for soldier, "milicos" is used in Southern Cone countries.

Document E is a key part of the White Paper since it describes a trip supposedly made by Shafik Handal to a number of Socialist countries, and the contributions of arms and supplies these countries allegedly made. It is four pages long and typed, with the accents marked in by hand. According to Document E, Handal was in Vietnam from June 9 to 15, 1980 where he was received by "Le Duan, the secretary general of the Vietnamese CP."


The document also says that both the Bulgarian and Hungarian governments are ready to manufacture 10,000 uniforms each for the Salvadoran guerrillas as soon as they receive the patterns and sizes. But, the document goes on, "the comrades' decision about the pattern is still pending." One has to stretch one's imagination considerably to believe that the guerrillas would be interested in providing Bulgarian and Hungarian clothing factories with patterns for 20,000 uniforms. The White Paper several times claims that the guerrilla forces are having problems in transporting arms and ammunition into El Salvador, let alone 20,000 uniforms.

Document F consists of two typed pages of "weapons commitments" from Vietnam, Ethiopia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic. It supposedly details shipments from these countries to the Salvadoran guerrillas via Cuba. Interestingly, Cuba is referred to by the code name "Esmeralda," while on the same page Havana is mentioned by name. (The Washington Post credits Jon Glassman with cracking the "Esmeralda" code.)

Document L, entitled by the State Department "Notes on arms deliveries (undated)", consists of three handwritten pages under a headline "First Shipment" with lists of arms and ammunition, but nothing else. The document does not give any indication where the arms came from,

and doesn't prove anything.

Document M, headlined "Report on logistical plans (undated)" - if it were a true document - almost makes one feel sorry for the ineptitude of the Salvadoran guerrillas. It outlines broad guidelines that presumably would not need to be stated in a "report on logistical plans" at this stage of the conflict, e.g., "The logistical plan must go hand-in-hand with a military plan, i.e. an assessment of exactly what are our strategic points and how to guarantee their maintenance and strengthening. The military plan must be in full accord with the political plan and guarantee political objectives in terms of global and current strategy..." Document M also contains one map which supposedly diagrams how weapons are being smuggled into El Salvador. Another map can be found in Document N, "Notes on delivery arrangements (undated)." It is reproduced below and appears completely meaningless.



There are other questions about the validity of the documents. Several of them, including some of the minutes and reports by members of the Salvadoran guerrilla groups, are very wordy and contain little specific information. However, most documents are very specific when it comes to pinpointing alleged outside assistance. Surprisingly, only a few code words are used and many persons (particularly the ones the U.S. government wants to pinpoint, such as Nicaraguan and Cuban government officials) and localities are referred to by their real names.

Most of the code names that are used are easy to crack, or are well known among the Salvadoran population, e.g. that the First Officer of the Central Command of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front uses the name of "Marcial." People that

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are referred to by name include Humberto Ortega and Bayardo Arce of the Sandinista Directorate, Fidel Castro and Yasir Arafat (who supposedly met some Salvadoran delegates in Managua; Vice President George Bush told Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir on February 20 that the PLO was aiding the Salvadoran guerrillas.) The various political organizations belonging to the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) are almost always mentioned by their real names. The State Department calls the FDR - with purposeful inaccuracy - a "Federation of political fronts of armed groups." In reality it is a political opposition organization consisting of a wide variety of parties, unions, organizations, and associations.

Finally, the White Paper contains two pictures of a trailer truck allegedly used to smuggle arms into El Salvador and seized by Honduran authorities in January 1981. Approximately 100 M-16 rifles "some of which are traceable to Vietnam," along with mortar rounds and ammunition were supposedly discovered in the "hollowed-out insulation on the top of the truck." Pictures were taken from two sides; one of them shows the back and one side of the trailer. The side of the trailer has horizontal lines and about eleven (the picture is blurred) vertical frames reaching almost to the trailer's roof. The other picture, supposedly of the same trailer, shows the exposed top of the trailer in which the rifles and other equipment are clearly visible. However, the picture is a composite of three different photos taken from a fairly high vantage point which were fitted together so crudely that the original length of the trailer has been changed. In addition, one can say with almost 100 percent certainty that the two pictures are not of the same trailer. The photos taken from above which reveal the weapons show part of the side of the trailer. However, this trailer has different siding than the trailer photographed from the back - the vertical lines are missing.

An examination of the contents of the White Paper in itself raises severe questions, but the way in which the paper was publicly released makes it even more questionable. First, parts of the White Paper were leaked to Juan de Onis, who, no questions asked, used them for a front page article in the New York Times on February

6, 1981. Quoting extensively from what was to become Document E, de Onis' article about Communist aid fit in nicely with on-going U.S. governmental propaganda efforts. De Onis followed up his first article with a second piece, again based on a "leak," on February 20. In this article de Onis copies a piece of information from the document which said that Iraqi aid to the Salvadorans amounted to \$500,000 - however, the Spanish "original" in the White Paper puts the amount at \$200,000. On February 20, the New York Times also reprinted the text of a State Department memorandum to friendly embassies in Washington on Communist interference in El Salvador. The State Department was pulling the strings, and the Times was playing its part.

Several other news organizations were given a summary of the White Paper on Friday, February 20, and the weekend editions of most dailies were full of reports of Communist aggression in El Salvador based on a State Department report - the White Paper - even though most journalists, who wrote the articles, had not even seen it yet. The Reagan administration's strategy of inundating the public with reports about Communist intervention had worked. In a massive media operation, they had managed to put out a tremendous amount of propaganda which they did not have to answer questions about since it had been "leaked" to the media.

When the complete White Paper was finally released on February 23, it was hardly considered newsworthy any more and escaped serious scrutiny. Indeed, it is evident that the State Department is not interested in having the White Paper analyzed. All it wanted - and got - was to get the message of Communist aggression out to the public. The State Department printed only 100 copies of the full document which, of course, were snatched up within minutes. Reporters asking for reprints are told that there are no more copies, and additional copies won't be printed either. The State Department press office is even refusing to xerox their copy of the White Paper for journalists who offer to pay for that service.

Along with managing the U.S. media campaign, the Reagan administration made a concerted effort to convince Latin American and Western European governments about the need to counter Communist aggression

in El Salvador militarily. Special missions were sent to several Latin American and NATO governments. At best, they received a mixed response, and a State Department official acknowledged "that the public response by the allies has not measured up to administration hopes." (Washington Star, 2/26/81)

Former CIA Deputy Director Vernon A. Walters was dispatched to Latin America, but was not able to find a single government willing to openly support Reagan's military strategy in El Salvador. In Mexico, he received a stunning rejection when he met with President López Portillo on February 20. The next day, Portillo met with a visiting Cuban minister and publicly stressed Mexico's warm ties with Cuba, and, in a reference to U.S. military actions in El Salvador said in a February 24 speech that it is "difficult to defend the principle of self-determination in face of the unscrupulous arrogance of military power."

Lawrence Eagleburger, now Assistant Secretary for European Affairs (he has held posts as State Department intelligence research specialist and economic officer, as political officer at NATO headquarters in Brussels and has been on the staff of the National Security Council) was sent abroad to win over NATO governments. He didn't have much luck either. The West German government cautioned him on escalation of the U.S. military role; Italian President Sandro Pertini said publicly that he had sent messages to President Reagan urging him not to turn El Salvador into another Vietnam, and even British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher issued a statement condemning "violence from every quarter."

Strong opposition to Reagan's policy is growing in numerous organizations in the U.S., including many labor union locals, the anti-draft movement, progressive political parties and religious organizations, especially the Catholic Church, and has even filtered down to some Republican members of Congress. After hearing several administration witnesses, including Undersecretary of State Walter Stoessel, on U.S. military aid to the Salvadoran regime, Republican Senator Warren Rudman commented that he found it "disturbing" that there "was the lack of a bottom line" in U.S. military assistance. Rudman and other Senators were particularly concerned

about Stoessel's statement that the level of aid to the Salvadoran military had to respond "not only to the present situation but to the potential of the other side to create further violence... There is, thus, an element of deterrence built into the level of our total support." (New York Times, 3/14/81)

Consolidation of a broad opposition front to Reagan's El Salvador strategy in the U.S. is hampered by the media which - even though it has raised questions about the level of U.S. military involvement - has accepted the State Department's version of events. Even Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, John Bushnell told some reporters that the press had been "very cooperative" in publishing "material meant to show Soviet involvement in El Salvador." Willingly, most of the corporate owned media is going along with State Department propaganda, as illustrated by its reporting about the White Paper, which, at best, is a questionable document and would certainly not be the first piece of "evidence" forged by the CIA. Former CIA officer Philip Agee stated that he himself "wrote up false documents... for years for the CIA in Latin America, in order to achieve the very same political purpose" that the White Paper is serving right now. (Guardian, 3/11/81)

*"When events do not sustain the claims,... the CIA manufactures the appropriate 'proof'," says former CIA officer and counterinsurgency expert Ralph McGehee. In an article for The Nation, McGehee writes that the CIA is manipulating public opinion on El Salvador as it did in earlier disinformation campaigns on Indonesia, Iran, and Chile of which he has personal knowledge. "What the CIA is now attempting in El Salvador is merely a reflection of what the United States has done in many countries" of the Third World. McGehee further says that the 18 pounds of documents allegedly "discovered" by Jon Glassman can be "none other than the product of yet another CIA forgery operation."*

*The CIA has already heavily censored McGehee's article for The Nation. As we go to press, the outcome of a lawsuit challenging the censorship is still pending.*

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Shafik Handal, who is prominently featured in the White Paper (along with the Cuban, Nicaraguan and Soviet governments) categorically denies the authenticity of the documents printed in the White Paper. Handal stated that "there is no doubt that this is a maneuver to justify the growing supply of U.S. arms and military personnel to the genocidal Christian Democratic military junta and prepare for an eventual military aggression in Central America." Handal asked: "With what moral right does [the U.S. government] question the right of the Salvadoran people to arm themselves and carry out a war of survival...? What is the legal and moral authority of the U.S. government to question this right being... the largest supplier of arms to the bloody dictatorships of Latin America...?" State Department spokesperson William Dyess did not see a need to respond to Handal's statement and said he "would not dignify [it] with any comment." State Department officials have also failed to comment on other fairly obvious questions about the White Paper - e.g. why the State Department and not the Salvadoran government was the one to release the documents, especially since the first set of documents had allegedly been discovered by Salvadoran officials in November 1980, and why the Department is not printing any more copies of the White Paper.

The White Paper would not be the only piece of disinformation about El Salvador that has been printed in the U.S. press. On March 4, 1981 for example, UPI issued a bulletin "URGENT" entitled "Guerrillas Attack U.S. Embassy with Submachinegun Fire - San Salvador, El Salvador. Leftist guerrillas raked the U.S. Embassy with submachinegun fire today as they drove past the building aboard two vehicles, authorities said... The Embassy has been a target of leftist guerrilla attacks because of U.S. military and economic support for the ruling military-Christian Democratic junta they are fighting to topple." Several hours later, UPI was forced to change its story to "Rightwing gunmen raked the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador with automatic rifle fire..." However, even this report concluded with: "The Embassy has been a target of leftist guerrilla attacks because of the U.S.... support for the ruling... junta."

Another incident was even more telling. On January 14, 1981 the Salvadoran govern-

ment displayed a burned-out boat on the beach of El Cuco. The government claimed that El Salvador had been invaded by some 100 well armed guerrillas and hinted that they had come from Nicaragua. The report received wide publicity in the U.S. media and, according to UPI, "Only hours after the invasion claim was in print, the United States released \$5 million in military aid to El Salvador's ruling... junta citing evidence of foreign support for the guerrillas."

Some time later, however, then U.S. Ambassador Robert White had to admit that the evidence provided by the Salvadoran government "did not support" the junta's claim of a 100 man invasion. Journalists went to the site of the alleged invasion - the Salvadoran military claimed it had killed 53 of the guerrillas and seized dozens of weapons - but found no sign of the other boats allegedly used in the operation, "no witnesses to an invasion and no bodies of dead guerrillas to be seen anywhere." UPI quoted one U.S. embassy employee commenting on U.S. trust in the Salvadoran report and the immediate assurance of military aid: "I guess we rushed to believe something we really wanted to believe." Needless to say, these challenges to the veracity of the story received very little media attention while the original, false report was featured on the front pages of most major U.S. dailies.

In the case of the El Salvador White Paper, the corporate-owned media in the U.S. likewise rushed to conclusions about Communist intervention in El Salvador because they "really wanted to believe" it. However, drawing conclusions about the validity of the White Paper is not just a matter of whom one believes. It has to be stressed that it is the State Department that wants to sell its version of events to the public, and, therefore it has to come up with proof for its charges of Communist subversion. And that has not been done. On the contrary, there are more than enough facts to lead one to the conclusion that the White Paper is forged. According to UPI, even Deputy Salvadoran Foreign Minister Alejandro Gomez "doubted the truthfulness" of one part of the captured documents.

It is not surprising that the government of Ronald Reagan and General Haig might be willing to put out documents of a highly



questionable validity. However, it is an indictment of U.S. journalists and media outlets who prostituted themselves by un-

questioningly going along with the government publicity campaign.

## U.S. Labor Against Intervention in El Salvador

An increasing number of labor union locals are openly opposing Ronald Reagan's military strategy for El Salvador and the assistance the U.S. government and the Duarte regime have received from the CIA-connected American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). Over the last few months, for example, the following labor organizations in southern California alone have joined the growing list: San Jose Federation of Teachers, Local 957, AFT; Central Labor Council of Santa Clara County AFL-CIO; Cannery Workers Committee of Teamsters Local 679, San Jose; Social Services Union, Locals 535 and 715, Services Employees International Union, Oakland and San Jose; Santa Cruz County Central Labor Council; International Chemical Workers Union, San Jose; Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 265, San Jose; Central Coast District Council 57, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, San Jose, Redwood City and Oakland; and International Molders and Allied Workers, Local 164, Oakland.

The Executive Board of the International Molders and Allied Workers, Local 164 sent the following letter to the Salvadoran Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR):

*Dear Brothers and Sisters:*

*We, the International Molders & Allied Workers Union, Local No. 164, strongly support F.D.R. in their struggle to achieve equality and better living and working conditions for the people in El Salvador.*

*We condemn the present government in El Salvador for their open violation of human rights...*

*We also strongly oppose any U.S. intervention or military aid to the present government. We strongly feel that the people of El Salvador should be allowed to resolve their own internal problems without interference.*

The following resolution of the Amalgam-

ated Transit Union, Local 265 is fairly typical of labor opposition to U.S. intervention in El Salvador. The resolution was adopted at the local's January 1981 membership meeting, and sent to Secretary of State Alexander Haig.

*WHEREAS, the Legal Aid Office of the Archdiocese of San Salvador has documented over 10,000 assassinations and hundreds of disappeared persons and illegal detentions in El Salvador in 1980; and*

*WHEREAS, the Archdiocese has reported that over 80% of the assassinations have been committed directly by the Salvadorean Armed Forces and by paramilitary groups supported by the Armed Forces; and*

*WHEREAS, a majority of the human rights violations have been directed against the working people of El Salvador;... and the bombings of union halls and suspension of all civil liberties have impeded free trade union organizing; and*

*WHEREAS, the U.S. government has supported the present Salvadorean regime since its inception on October 15, 1979, and has since authorized more economic and military aid to El Salvador than it authorized in the preceding decade; and*

*WHEREAS, the American Institute of Free Labor Development, partially sponsored by the AFL-CIO, operates in El Salvador; and has not condemned the Salvadorean junta for its massive violations of human and worker's rights; THEREFORE BE IT*

*RESOLVED, that Local 265 -- its members call for the U.S. government to cut-off all economic and military aid to the unelected junta government in El Salvador, withdraw all advisors and military personnel from El Salvador and cease all present and future forms of intervention in that country; and BE IT FURTHER*

*RESOLVED, that Local 265 -- its members request that the AFL-CIO disassociate itself from the AIFLD program in El Salvador.*

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Late last year, the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) also decided that it would "refuse to handle any and all U.S. military cargo bound for El Salvador." The ILWU's newspaper, The Dispatcher, described the decision:

*The announcement came in the wake of continued reports of systematic executions of thousands of innocent people by the current U.S.-supported military government, along with kidnapping, torture, and murder of opponents of the regime, including numerous church, peasant, and trade union leaders.*

*"We do not invoke this boycott weapon lightly," International President Jim Herman told a large group of national and local media... "We have made a thorough investigation of the situation in El Salvador and find ourselves driven by such action as the only reasonable and humane alternative..."*

*"We take this step in order to express*

*our profound revulsion at the reign of terror which has been imposed upon the people of El Salvador by their government. ... If by our action we can stop one bullet, loaded by our hands, from killing one innocent citizen in El Salvador, we will be extremely pleased."*

*ILWU members, Herman said... will monitor and intercept any military cargo bound for El Salvador on the West Coast. At least one "substantial shipment" of military goods... was taken off the dock immediately after the press conference and hauled over to the Oakland army base for storage that same day.*

Keith W. Johnson, the President of the International Woodworkers of America congratulated the ILWU on their action by saying that "Your actions are living proof that American workers can effectively bring pressure to end the shameful traffic in weapons which produces only profits to corporate merchants of death and death to Latin American workers."

## Terrorism in Guatemala

The recent Amnesty International report\* on Guatemala is an unusually blunt indictment of the military government of President Romeo Lucas Garcia. It states that between January and November 1980 alone, "some 3,000 people described by government representatives as 'subversives' and 'criminals' were either shot on the spot in political assassinations or seized and murdered later." Amnesty International (AI) leaves no doubt as to who is responsible for these killings: "... people who oppose or are imagined to oppose the government are systematically seized without warrant, tortured and murdered... these tortures and murders are part of a deliberate and longstanding program of the Guatemalan Government."

The government has denied "making a single arrest or holding a single political prisoner." It blames independent death

\*Copies of the full report, which was released on February 18, 1981 may be ordered from AI, 204 W. 58th St, New York, NY 10019.

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squads for the brutal murders of thousands of people and calls the murder and torture victims "criminals" and "subversives." AI, however, "believes that abuses attributed by the Government... to independent 'death squads' are perpetrated by the regular forces of the civil and military services." More specifically, AI says the one responsible for these operations is President Lucas himself. "The task of coordinating civil and military security operations in the political sphere is carried out by a specialized agency under the direct supervision of President Lucas Garcia. This presidential agency is situated in the Presidential Guard annex to the National Palace,... and next to the Presidential Residence... Known until recently as the Centro Regional de Telecomunicaciones (Regional Telecommunications Centre), the agency is... a key installation in Guatemala's security network."

A 1974 Agency for International Development (AID) document, Termination Phase-Out Study, Public Safety Project: Guatemala

describes the Telecommunications Center as "Guatemala's principal presidential level security agency." AI concedes that "details of the presidential coordinating agency's operation are not known... but that the agency exists and that it serves as the centre of the Guatemalan Government's program of 'disappearance' and political murder seem... difficult to dispute."

Under the Carter administration, military assistance to the Lucas regime was suspended - only to be taken up by Israel and other conservative governments, e.g. Argentina. With Ronald Reagan in office, things look different. Reagan himself has met with rightwing, wealthy Guatemalans over the last few years. According to the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, representatives of several rightwing groups including Young Americans for Freedom, the Heritage Foundation and the American Conservative Union, as well as Generals John Singlaub and Daniel Graham of the American

Security Council and Richard Allen, now National Security Advisor, visited Guatemala in 1980; and, while still a candidate, Reagan let the Guatemalan right know that, if elected, he would change U.S. policy toward their country.

In the primitive Republican anti-Communist strategy Guatemala, with the largest army in Central America, is key, and Reagan's all out support for the Guatemalan military dictatorship is assured. The bloodshed will continue but has not been and will not be able to stop the opposition movement from growing. There is a high level of unity between the different opposition and guerrilla organizations, and their activities have forced the army to "intensify their troop mobilizations to points across the country and to be in a permanent state of alert... which has kept them from intervening on a broader scale, as they would have liked, against the people of El Salvador."

## Princeton's Psy-War

The following recommendations for a world-wide anti-Communist propaganda campaign (from the Allen Dulles papers at Princeton University) were written almost twenty years ago, but are of contemporary significance. They were drafted by covert CIA consultant Hadley Cantril, then an "eminent" social scientist and chairperson of the Psychology Department at the prestigious Princeton University. He sent the recommendations to former CIA Director Allen Dulles on March 21, 1962, together with a short note.

Dear Allen,

Enclosed are the recommendations I worked up some years ago (after my visit to the Soviet Union) and which might be of some use to you. Please do not bother to acknowledge.

As ever,

/signed/  
Hadley

(Despite their "scientific" source, the recommendations are neither scientific nor

objective - which is probably why Cantril did not want his name attached to them.)

At a time when the Reagan administration has launched cold war tirades against Socialist countries and "international terrorism" (increased emphasis is also being placed on the operations of the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty), it is as important as it was twenty years ago to understand the nature of U.S. propaganda operations.

### RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING U.S. INFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA THEMES

Note: While these recommendations may not be new and may have been heard before, if they have any validity, it is essential that they be repeated and repeated in rifle shot fashion.

1) Try to pound home to people everywhere, especially those in uncommitted areas, the fact that the Communist Party uses nations and states and the people who compose them as instruments or tools to carry out Party policies. In other words, the Party comes

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first and is regarded as "everlasting," while nations, or states and their people are secondary and are to be organized and reorganized according to Party goals. Examples of the USSR itself, East Germany, Hungary, China, Tibet, etc.

2) Make clear to people that the issue dividing the people in developed areas is not "COMMUNISM" (or "SOCIALISM") versus "CAPITALISM" but the dictatorship of the Communist Party versus democracy. We should be able to undercut the effective use Soviet leaders now make of the key words of "Communism," "Socialism," and "Capitalism" by pointing out how outworn, old-fashioned, oversimplified and misleading these terms are if anyone takes an honest look at what is going on in different countries of the world. Many concrete examples should be given.

In underdeveloped areas of the world the problem is likewise not one of "COMMUNISM" versus "CAPITALISM" but the dictatorship of the Communist Party versus the possibility of national development in a free and open way. We should make clear that the only real enemy of strong national leaders now guiding some underdeveloped areas is the Communist Party. (Certainly these leaders are never going to be overthrown by any non-existent "American" party, etc.)

3) Show that while Soviet leaders talk about "co-existence," in reality they seem to be afraid of it. They object to open skies and to an open world. They do not allow their people to know about democracy, they hem people in with controls and restrictions concerning what information they can have, what traveling they can do, etc. By contrast, Western democracies are not at all afraid of "co-existence," and encourage their people to read anything they want to, to travel, etc., etc.

4) We should not let Soviet leaders set the standards by means of which superiority is to be judged. We should, on the contrary, quickly and forcefully take the initiative and try to get in the minds of people everywhere what we regard as the goals worth competing for. For example, an increase in standards of living alone will never reconcile people to a permanent condition of "unfreedom."

In this connection, there is a paramount need for some ideological statement concerning our American vision of the kind

of world people want. Quite obviously, such a statement must avoid platitudes. It should be designed carefully to provide a moral basis for all our defense and economic aid measures as well as for our domestic policies. All our information and propaganda could profit by being put in terms of our moral purposes since the basic values people are striving for are similar, universal, and understandable.

We should be able to out-compete the Soviet Union in teaching people in underdeveloped areas what to want -- what "progress" and "civilization" can and should refer to; showing that an open society can offer not only high standards of living and security but a whole range and quality of satisfactions impossible in a state where freedom and choice are taboo.

5) Counteract Soviet strategy of minimizing the similarities and maximizing the differences between modern industrial states. They have many problems in common and are likely to have more. Point out that the basic needs of human beings are everywhere pretty much alike and that any nation or political system will in the long run survive only to the extent that it fulfills all these needs - both physical and psychological ("spiritual").

6) Compliment the Soviet people on the advances they have made in their standard of living and on gaining somewhat more freedom of action as a result of their hardships and sacrifices. The sense of having lifted themselves out of long centuries of backwardness is a source of great pride to them and we must never say anything that would injure this pride. On the contrary,

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by complimenting them in terms of our own standards, our own goals, and our own ways of doing things, we could further build up the U.S. as a model and help continue pressure for more consumer goods, more freedom of action, etc.

Indicate our sincere hope that the great strides the Soviet people have made in raising their standard of living and increasing somewhat their own freedom of action will continue and that their government will not use recent events as an excuse to cut back production of consumer

goods or restrict further individual participation in decisions.

7) Intensify and expand all forms of exchanges since there seems little doubt that we have much more to gain from these in terms of influencing Soviet people than Soviet leaders have to gain from what they would learn from us. Dramatic proposals (which we would expect Soviet leaders to reject) might further bring their censorship, controls, and fear of comparison into bolder relief.

## Washington Post - Speaking for Whom?

by John Kelly

(Ed. note: John Kelly is co-editor of CounterSpy magazine and the author of the forthcoming book, The CIA in America.)

In 1949 Allen W. Dulles called for a "commission of internal security" to investigate "subversive influences" in the U.S. and to use "the institutions of democracy to destroy them." Dulles' article, appearing in the CIA-financed New Leader, did not define these subversive influences nor did it contain any factual evidence that they existed at all. That didn't seem to bother the Washington Post, which quickly took up the call-to-arms in a series of editorials beginning May 22, 1950. But even before the first editorial was printed, publisher Philip L. Graham (a former military intelligence officer and close friend of the CIA's chief psychological warfarer, Frank Wisner) and Post owner, Eugene Meyer<sup>1</sup> sent Dulles a copy and elicited his comments in an accompanying personal note.

May 21, 1950

Dear Mr. Dulles:

We are devoting our editorial page on Monday to the enclosed editorial, which we are also reprinting in advertisement form in New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago and San Francisco. Because of the importance of the issues involved, Mr. Eugene Meyer and I will both be grateful

if you could see fit to send us your comments on the editorial. Since we would like to follow up the editorial as quickly as possible, I would especially appreciate it if you could send your comments by Western Union collect.

Sincerely

/signed/  
Philip L. Graham  
Publisher

Dulles responded quickly in a telegram from his Wall Street office (see below). He specified that the proposed commission would in fact be a "federal agency" at the level of, but distinct from, the FBI. Very probably Dulles had the CIA in mind for the job although he knew well that the CIA's own charter prohibited internal security functions.

5/23/50

PHILIP L. GRAHAM, PUBLISHER  
THE WASHINGTON POST  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

REFERRING YOUR LETTER MAY 21 I THOROUGHLY AGREE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE A COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY. IN FACT IN ADDRESSING THE ANNUAL DINNER OF THE CANADIAN SOCIETY OVER A YEAR AGO ON JANUARY 28, 1949, I SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE IN THE UNITED STATES SOMETHING COMPARABLE TO THE CANADIAN ROYAL COMMISSION WHICH DID SUCH AN OUTSTANDING JOB IN INVESTIGATING THE

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SOVIET SPY RING IN CANADA AND I ADDED THAT "THE SUCCESS OF THE COMMISSION'S WORK POINTS TO THE DESIRABILITY OF HAVING AVAILABLE HERE IN THE UNITED STATES A FEDERAL AGENCY WHICH WE MIGHT FOR CONVENIENCE CALL "COMMISSION ON INTERNAL SECURITY". \* \* \* SUCH A COMMISSION COULD INVESTIGATE THE PRACTICES AND POLICIES OF SOVIET COMMUNISM STEMMING FROM ABROAD BUT OPERATING HERE AND FANNING OUT IN VARIOUS CHANNELS TO THREATEN OUR DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. IN FACT, IT COULD SHOW HOW THEY USE AND ABUSE THESE VERY INSTITUTIONS OF LIBERTY TO DESTROY LIBERTY."

AS REGARDS PRECISE FORM OF YOUR SUGGESTION I FEEL THAT YOU HAVE SO EXPANDED THE PROPOSED SCOPE OF THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION THAT ITS EFFECTIVENESS MIGHT BE IMPAIRED. PERSONALLY I THINK THE COMMISSION WOULD HAVE PLENTY TO DO IF THEY INVESTIGATED THE MAJOR ASPECTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE INTERNAL MENACE OF FIFTH COLUMNS AND SUBVERSIVE PENETRATION WITHOUT ALSO GOING INTO THE WHOLE RANGE OF CIVILIAN DEFENSE, NEW WEAPONS AND ECONOMIC AID TO OUR ALLIES. THE LATTER ARE ALL IMPORTANT QUESTIONS BUT EACH IS A MAJOR STUDY IN ITSELF.

WHILE I JOIN WITH YOU IN DEEPLY DEPRECIATING AND REPUDIATING THE TACTICS WHICH HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED IN BLACKENING REPUTATIONS WITHOUT EVIDENCE, I AM SURE YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT MANY PEOPLE WHO FEEL AS I DO IN THIS RESPECT. NEVERTHELESS HAVE AN UNEASY FEELING THAT SUBVERSIVE INFLUENCES MAY HAVE BEEN A CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE OF SOME OF THE FAILURES OF FAR EASTERN POLICY AND THAT INCIDENTS SUCH AS THE AMERASIA CASE DESERVE THE FULLEST INVESTIGATION BY A COMPETENT AND IMPARTIAL COMMISSION SUCH AS YOU SUGGEST.

ONE FINAL WORD. ANY SUCH COMMISSION AS PROPOSED SHOULD NOT INTERFERE IN ANY WAY WITH THE FBI AND SHOULD NOT HAVE OVERLAPPING FUNCTIONS WITH THE LATTER AS I FEEL STRONGLY THAT THE FBI MERITS AND DESERVES OUR SUPPORT.

ALLEN DULLES

The Post featured most of Dulles' telegram along with one from General Lucius D. Clay, on its May 25, 1950 front page. The Post, of course, did not acknowledge that Dulles' comments had been solicited in response to an advance copy of the editorial. (Clay, a man with wide corporate connections, was involved in the Marshall Plan and illegally used some of the

Plan's counterpart funds to finance early CIA covert operations.<sup>2</sup>)

The Post's proposed commission on national security was a draconian measure which even President Harry Truman opposed as unconstitutional.<sup>3</sup> Entitled "The Road Back to America," the editorial did not oppose the on-going McCarthyite witch-hunting per se, but called it inefficient at getting "the rats" in America. As the Post put it: "Witch-hunting thus amounts to doing the job of softening and weakening America for Russia... To go further: Witch-hunting is weakening our front-line soldiers in the cold war."

The Post fully endorsed the cold war both abroad and at home. But speaking, as it always does, from the perspective of the corporate rich, the Post wanted the cold war carried out with an eye to repressing legitimate domestic dissent while expanding the military-industrial complex:

"Witch-hunting will drive out of Government the very brains which alone can give us victory in the cold war...

William Allen White and Paul Hoffmann and Wall Street lawyers and Robert A. Taft...

"... witch-hunting will defeat the purported purpose of witch-hunting... the class bitterness stirred up by those excesses still hurts our unity...

"It is essential that a 'commission on national security' be created now to survey the major aspects of national security - the internal menace of the fifth column, civilian defense, development of new weapons, the size and use of military expenditures, economic restoration of our friends and allies..."

The editorial criticized Senator Joseph McCarthy because he was not one of them, and his witch-hunting was threatening U.S. corporate expansion by attacking allegedly Communist government employees who were promoting that expansion. As the Post editorialized only three days earlier on May 19, 1950: "For the McCarthy attempts could easily result... in the paralysis of foreign policy... From Paris to Rio de Janeiro, reports are coming in that the solidarity of American influence in the cold war is being drastically undermined by the efforts to find a scapegoat for past events." Praising the Post for its promotion of U.S. corporate expansion, Gen. Clay described the editorial as an "approach to the correction of conditions

which tend to destroy the effectiveness of our international position."<sup>4</sup>

The Post editorial was significantly timed only weeks after National Security Council directive, NSC-68, written under the direction of Paul Nitze (from NSC member James Forrestal's investment banking house of Dillon, Read). NSC-68 escalated the cold war by calling for rapid expansion of foreign investments, vast increases in CIA covert operations (under Frank Wisner) and orchestrating of public opinion in support of the cold war. NSC-68 claimed this was needed because: "A free society is vulnerable in that it is easy for people to lapse into excesses - the excesses of a permanently open mind..."

On September 14, 1948, Philip Graham, at the request of Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, convened a private meeting of some 20 newspaper publishers at his Georgetown home (the former residence of William "Wild Bill" Donovan, once director of the OSS). A few months prior to this meeting, Forrestal had launched CIA covert operations including propaganda operations in the U.S. As part of this operation, Forrestal had previously asked many of the publishers and editors who came to Graham's on September 14 to secretly submit to formal government censorship - which they refused.

Besides Forrestal, attending the meeting for the government were George C. Marshall, Secretary of State; General Omar N. Bradley; Robert Lovett, Undersecretary of State; and Charles E. "Chip" Bohlen, Counselor of the State Department. The meeting was convened "to brief them [publishers and editors] on the Berlin crisis..." but Forrestal also inquired whether those present would support using the atomic bomb in the event of war. Speaking for the "American people" those present gave "unanimous agreement... to the propriety of the use of the atomic bomb." That same year, the Post editorialized in favor of the "appointment of a commission of leading citizen" (undoubtedly corporate executives and Wall Street attorneys) to determine when the U.S. should use atomic weapons. Obviously, the Post owners believed that decisions potentially affecting the lives of hundreds of millions of human beings should be examined and made by a few wealthy Americans.

1950 was also the year that Wisner's deputy, Thomas Braden (who is often featured in the Post and who considered Wisner "an authentic American hero") initiated the CIA's International Organization Division which eventually fed CIA propaganda to some 30 U.S. newspapers, including the Post.<sup>5</sup>

Fortunately for U.S. democracy, the Post's commission on national security never became a formal reality. Unfortunately, for freedom of the press, Graham and Meyer placed the Washington Post at the service of national security and anti-Communism as defined by the corporate rich and the CIA. To this end, Philip and later Katherine Graham hired a number of people with extensive ties to U.S. intelligence agencies to work for the Post. They included Philip Geyelin, who was recently replaced as editorial page editor but still writes frequent commentaries, staff reporter Walter Pincus; Russell Warren Howe, who is now retired but still publishes occasional articles; and Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, a member of the Post's Board of Directors.

#### PHILIP GEYELIN

Geyelin joined the CIA in 1951 while on leave of absence from the Wall Street Journal to which he returned after 11 months at the CIA.<sup>6</sup> At the Journal, Geyelin said he "frequently had the sort of contacts with CIA officials that news people have with any other sources."<sup>7</sup> During this period, CIA memos, of which there are hundreds, described Geyelin as "a reliable source," a "CIA resource" and a "willing collaborator" who provided "intelligence" such as two "economic reports" following his trip to Cuba in 1964.<sup>8</sup> Later, Geyelin's book, Lyndon B. Johnson and the World, was published by the CIA's perhaps most favorite publisher, Frederick A. Praeger, who now publishes CIA-authored books through his Westview Press.

Geyelin has always come to the defense of the CIA when it was under deserved criticism. One has to seriously question the integrity of the Post management for assigning a former CIA employee as the writer of editorials which do not even carry his name. As even former Post ombudsman Charles B. Seib once observed: "The CIA's stock-in-trade includes deception and covert manipulation. It does the

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nation's undercover dirty work. The press, on the other hand, has only one justification for its special status in this country: its ability to inform the public fully and without bias or restraints... and the twain can never meet."<sup>9</sup>

A specific example of Geyelin's fending for the CIA was his full page article in the Post of May 21, 1978 when Congress was attempting to rid the press of the CIA. Geyelin said that he disagreed with Seib's conclusion that "the twain can never meet" and agreed with Ray S. Cline that journalists and CIA agents "all are searching for nuggets of truth about the outside world."<sup>10</sup> Geyelin opposed a specific law prohibiting CIA penetration of the press and said that instead the press should just regulate itself. (He proposed this after implying that the CIA had dishonestly manipulated him.) Geyelin warned: "In the course of preparing a comprehensive charter to govern the future of the CIA, and in its zeal to restrict the freedom of the agency to subvert the press, it seems to me entirely possible that Congress could wind up making a law that would in fact abridge - or threaten to abridge - some part of the freedom of the press that the First Amendment was intended to protect."<sup>11</sup> In short, according to Geyelin, the First Amendment provides for the press' opportunity to be approached for subversion by the CIA. Undoubtedly to Geyelin's relief, Congress passed no law restricting the CIA's use of the press.

#### WALTER PINCUS

Pincus worked for the CIA's Independent Research Service (IRS) beginning in 1959 when he attended the International Youth Festival in Vienna.<sup>12</sup> He was one of the CIA-financed and trained delegates who spied on fellow Americans and disrupted festival proceedings. Following the 1959 trip, Pincus briefed the CIA, took a CIA pledge of secrecy, and agreed to attend the 1960 youth festival in Accra, Ghana for the CIA.

Before leaving for Ghana, the CIA even briefed Pincus on his fellow American delegates. Pincus was also made privy "in some detail to the extent to which the agency was operating in the field" and was asked to join the CIA.<sup>13</sup> From Ghana, Pincus went to Guinea at the invitation of the Guinean Youth Committee. Upon returning to the U.S., Pincus briefed the CIA

about Ghana and Guinea. Pincus claims to have refused a permanent job with the CIA but three months later attended a political meeting in New Delhi, India at the request of the CIA. Pincus further claims that "thereafter I left the international youth world to others."<sup>14</sup>

Like Geyelin, Pincus has subtly supported the CIA at crucial moments. His Post article on his CIA work came precisely when the CIA was criticized for its subversion of the National Student Association (NSA). Pincus' article presented these operations as if they were honorable and as natural as rain. Along with Richard Harwood, he also published a major article in the Post before former Post reporter, Carl Bernstein's exposé of the CIA's penetration and manipulation of the press was even published. Pincus and Harwood downplayed Bernstein's article (which they somehow received in advance) even though Bernstein let Katherine Graham off the hook, absolving her from any responsibility for Post involvement with the CIA. As Harwood and Pincus concluded: "So there is considerable uncertainty as to the accuracy of Bernstein's claims and sweeping conclusions."<sup>15</sup> Pincus, of course, was nowhere to be found when the vast majority of Bernstein's claims were substantiated by others such as former New York Times correspondent, Harrison E. Salisbury.

#### RUSSELL WARREN HOWE

Russell W. Howe recently posed the question: "What links between the press and the CIA are justifiable?" He answered: "Obviously some are - and more were once."<sup>16</sup> This was not a surprising response since Howe himself has said that in 1958 his "days as an asset had begun."<sup>17</sup> He was referring to articles he wrote for the CIA proprietary Information Bulletin Ltd. which he knew at the time was funded by the Congress for Cultural Freedom.<sup>18</sup> From 1958 through 1965, Howe produced some 30 articles for the Bulletin and its successor, Forum Service. As Howe described them: "They were the same sort of stories that I was writing for the Post's 'Outlook' section..."<sup>19</sup> In 1966, Forum Service became Forum World Features (FWF), headed by CIA officer Robert Gene Gately, formerly of Newsweek. In the same year, multimillionaire John H. Whitney, former publisher of the New York Herald Tribune and



part-owner of the International Herald Tribune bought FWF.<sup>20</sup> In 1967, the Congress for Cultural Freedom was exposed as a CIA front and Whitney as a CIA collaborator. By then, FWF had become, in the words of Howe, "the principal CIA media effort in the world."<sup>21</sup>

Howe continued to write for FWF, although he had read Ramparts magazine's expose of CCF's CIA funding. "The thought itself never occurred" to him, says Howe, to ask Whitney about his CIA connections.<sup>22</sup> In 1968, when Howe was still writing for both the Post and FWF, Whitney got the Post to agree to purchase FWF stories.<sup>23</sup> According to the Church Committee, the Post - along with some four other major daily U.S. newspapers - was told that FWF was "CIA controlled."<sup>24</sup> This means that the Post consciously chose to publish CIA propaganda and knew that one of its full time reporters, Howe, worked for a CIA proprietary. Howe ultimately wrote some 250 articles for FWF as well as for the CIA-funded Africa Report and Survey. (Even before FWF, he had been the French correspondent for Business International whose founder Eldridge Haynes allowed the CIA to use the magazine as a cover.) Incredibly, Howe claims that: "I was apparently what was known as an unwitting asset."<sup>25</sup>

#### NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH

Katherine Graham is said to have invited Nicholas de B. Katzenbach to join the board of directors of the Washington Post; an invitation which he accepted. Katzenbach is still on the board despite revelations in the Post itself that, as U.S. Deputy Attorney General, he called James Russell Wiggins, then Post editorial page editor, and asked him to alter an upcoming Post editorial.<sup>26</sup> It is also well known that Katzenbach neutralized the 1967 exposés of the CIA's illegal domestic operations. Again, the Post itself reported that Katzenbach met secretly with then-President of the National Student Association (NSA), Eugene Groves, a CIA collaborator, to develop a strategy to minimize the upcoming exposé about the CIA/NSA operations.<sup>27</sup> Katzenbach then chaired the presidential panel which "investigated" the CIA/NSA and other domestic operations. Worse yet, Katzenbach at the time was a member of the "303 Committee" (predecessor

to the "40 Committee") which lent an air of legality to CIA covert operations through rubber-stamp approval.<sup>28</sup>

Katzenbach, who has stated that no matter what they did in the past, the CIA and the FBI are the "most decent and effective" intelligence agencies in the world,<sup>29</sup> was also involved in the FBI's operations against Martin Luther King, Jr. According to the Church Committee, "the sustained use of such tactics by the FBI as an attempt to destroy Martin Luther King, Jr. violated the law and fundamental human decency... There is no question that officials in the White House and Justice Department, including President Johnson and Attorney General Katzenbach, knew that the Bureau was taking steps to discredit Dr. King..."<sup>30</sup> "Knew", indeed. Katzenbach had told then FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover that the FBI could undertake various wiretapping operations and come to Katzenbach afterwards for his approval. The Church Committee produced three such memos signed by Katzenbach.

#### KATHERINE GRAHAM

Earlier this year, Post publisher Katherine Graham hosted a dinner party at her house for Ronald Reagan and some members of his cabinet, including CIA Director William Casey. Even before he was President, candidate Reagan had been fettered at a Post luncheon where he reportedly "impressed" Post executive editor Benjamin Bradlee.

Katherine Graham has been a member of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) which acts as an interface between the corporate rich, the CIA, and their apologists. Then-CIA Director William Colby highlighted this relationship in a report on CIA domestic operations to the CFR before his report to Congress.

Graham, who hired the CIA-involved Wackenhut Security Corporation during the Post's union busting operations, wrote the following note to fellow CFR member and former CIA Director Allen Dulles after he had been fired for the CIA's illegal invasion of the Bay of Pigs, Cuba. Dulles, at the time, was an object of worldwide criticism for his many CIA crimes including his sabotaging of the integrity of the press.

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2920 R Street  
Washington 7, D.C.

Wednesday

Dear Allen and Clover,

I have thought of you so many times since last spring and never had the wits to write what I was thinking. So I wanted to take the chance of your formal resignation to tell you how marvelous and admirable you both have been always and especially recently.

We all know that Allen has done such wonderful things for the country for so many years. And it must seem such agony to seem so unappreciated now. I think public things are often temporarily unjust but that in the long run the people will understand and be grateful for such unceasing and brilliant devotion.

We both send our love and hopes that we'll see you very soon and often.

Kay

Katherine Graham and Allen Dulles had a friend in common; the late Shah of Iran whose ambassador used to send them both free gifts such as caviar. Graham paid a personal "solidarity" visit to the deposed Shah in his final hideaway in Egypt. Graham later told a gathering of Post workers that her visit with the ex-Shah was one of the highlights of her Middle East trip. She said the Shah was a "sad and lonely" man surrounded by an "air of pathos" and deserted by his friends.<sup>31</sup>

#### EDITORIAL POLICY

Meg Greenfield, who recently replaced Philip Geyelin as Post editorial page editor, accompanied Graham on her Middle East trip. Greenfield had served for many years as Geyelin's deputy after having worked for eleven years for Reporter magazine under executive editor Philip Horton, the CIA's first chief of station in Paris.<sup>32</sup>

Recently, in an editorial, "Can We Help Uganda?",<sup>33</sup> the Post called for the resurrection of the CIA's International Police Academy (IPA) which Congress closed in 1974 in outrage at its activities. Specifically, the editorial called for resuming the training of police in Uganda, the very country in which the CIA had trained and equipped the police assassins and torturers of Idi Amin. (IPA graduates also include Roberto d'Abuissou, leader of the 18 - CounterSpy, May-July 1981

extreme right in El Salvador.<sup>34</sup>) Despite the bloody history of the CIA's police programs and their widespread atrocities in Vietnam, the Post editorial, à la Ronald Reagan, says the government should

"In due course I learned, by means of discreet inquiry, that the Post, like other major news media, maintained 'contacts' with the CIA in order to receive 'guidance' on 'sensitive' stories."

Former Post reporter, Erwin Knoll  
The Progressive, May 1979

not be held back by the "tiger cage syndrome."

With the likes of General Haig bombarding the country with cold war propaganda, this is a time of great need for an independent, truthful press. The people in the U.S. will never receive the whole truth, except coincidentally, as long as there is a CIA-press connection. Even long-time CIA collaborator, Harrison E. Salisbury recently stated: "Once again - as it had happened so often and was to happen so frequently - it was *the truth* that the CIA feared above all things, truth was what was so 'frightening' in the Agency's words,... its men felt, the truth must be avoided at all cost."<sup>35</sup>

The Post management should follow the example of some of its rank-and-file workers who ejected the CIA from the Newspaper Guild in 1967 and have successfully continued to resist all attempts (led by Charles Perlik) to allow the CIA to use the Guild for its international programs. The Guild's actions show it can be done, and until it is done by newspapers such as the Washington Post, we will not have a free press.

#### FOOTNOTES

- 1) Eugene Meyer, a multimillionaire who also championed the expansion of U.S. foreign investments later became the first president of the World Bank. The Bank underwrote the vast expansion of U.S. corporate foreign investments with taxpayers' money.
- 2) Fred Hirsch and Richard Fletcher, CIA and the Labour Movement, Spokesman Books, Nottingham, England, 1977, p. 69. Clay at the time headed the U.S. Military Government in West Germany. His use of counterpart funds was illegal since by law they should have been repatriated to the U.S.
- 3) Truman, however, did support the repressive loyalty oath programs conducted by the American Federation of Labor and the CIA-financed National Education Association against law-abiding teachers across the country.
- 4) Washington Post (WP), 5/25/50, p.1
- 5) Saturday Evening Post, 5/20/67, p.12; More, May 78, p.26.

- 6) WP, 5/21/78, p.B-2.
- 7) *ibid.*
- 8) *ibid.*; Harrison E. Salisbury, Without Fear or Favor, Times Books, New York, 1980, p.572.
- 9) WP, 5/21/78, p.B-2.
- 10) *ibid.*
- 11) *ibid.*
- 12) WP, 2/17/67, pp.A-1, A-5. In a published account of the festival disruptions, Pincus and Philip M. Cronin were commended for their effective approach in disrupting the "Meeting of Young Journalists" seminar. They were cited by their fellow participant, Cliff Thompson (The Harvard Crimson, 10/14/59, p.6).
- 13) *ibid.*
- 14) WP, 9/18/77, pp.B-1, B-4. Richard Harwood wrote a number of significant CIA exposés until he became Post deputy managing editor.
- 15) *ibid.*, p.B-4.
- 16) More, May 78, p.27.
- 17) *ibid.*, p.22.
- 18) *ibid.*
- 19) *ibid.*
- 20) *ibid.*, p.23.
- 21) *ibid.*, p.24.
- 22) *ibid.*, p.25.
- 23) *ibid.*, p.26.
- 24) *ibid.*
- 25) *ibid.*, pp.21,26.
- 26) WP, 12/8/77, p.A-3.
- 27) WP, 3/9/67; New York Post, 3/9/67, p.P-2.
- 28) Washington Star, 5/8/75.
- 29) *ibid.*
- 30) Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Agencies, "Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans," Book II, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C., 4/26/76, pp.211, 275.
- 31) Shop Talk (published by the Communications Department of the Post), vol.5, no.26, 6/26/80, p.2.
- 32) R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1972, p.209.
- 33) As printed in: International Herald Tribune, 9/27-28/80.
- 34) WP, 3/9/81, p.A-19.
- 35) cf *supra*, #8, p.521.

## Secret World Bank Plan for Indonesia

by Joel Lacamora

(Ed. note: Joel Lacamora is an Associate of the South East Asia Resource Center and an Indonesia specialist.)

In a highly confidential study recently obtained by CounterSpy and the Southeast Asia Resource Center, the World Bank warns the Suharto government of what it perceives to be a nationalist drift in current economic policy and prescribes drastic measures to facilitate the entry of foreign capital. These steps, the Bank asserts, would constitute "strong medicine for the Indonesian economy..."<sup>1</sup> The secret document also highlights the conflicts between U.S. and Japanese investments in Indonesia and illustrates that the World Bank is, in fact, siding with U.S. capital in this clash.

Together with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank has played a strong directive role in shaping the economic policies of the Suharto regime. The Bank was key in forming the Inter-Governmental Group of Indonesia (IGGI) in 1967, consisting of itself, the IMF, and 13 creditor nations, which eased the conditions of repayment for the debts incurred by the previous nationalist Sukarno government in return for an "open-door" policy toward foreign capital.<sup>2</sup> The Bank has

been Indonesia's biggest development donor, and the amount of the loans funnelled to Suharto - over \$4 billion - is greater than that received by any other Southeast Asian country. Its creditor role has translated into enormous programmatic decision-making power, exercised through front-groups such as the notorious "Berkeley Mafia" of West Coast-educated technocrats who laid the economic foundations of Indonesia's "New Order" after the CIA-backed coup that toppled Sukarno and initiated a reign of terror that took at least 600,000 lives (see CounterSpy, Oct.-Dec. 1979).

### RETURN TO THE GOLDEN AGE

In the 600-page secret document titled "Selected Issues of Industrial Development and Trade Strategy," a Bank mission that visited Indonesia in 1979 warns the Indonesians that they must return to the "Golden Age" characterized by the virtually unrestricted entry of foreign capital that prevailed between 1967 and 1974. "The view that private foreign investment could play a leading role in the development process is underlyed by the highly favorable incentives and guarantees to foreign investors... was dominant for only a

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relatively brief period after 1967," be-  
moans the report. "A series of policy de-  
cisions in the mid-1970's significantly  
qualified the 'open door' policy. The most  
important of these were requirements for  
greater and more rapid increases in local  
participation in ownership; greater con-  
trols on investment including the closing  
of significant areas to private foreign  
investment; prohibition on foreign firms  
engaging in any distribution activities  
(even for their own products); require-  
ments for more rapid promotion of Indone-  
sians to high skilled and managerial posi-  
tions; and renegotiations of terms affect-  
ing foreign investment in the natural re-  
source-based industries."

The Bank does not mention that the key  
policy changes it identifies constituted a  
defensive response on the part of the  
Suharto government to the mass nationalist  
sentiment which exploded during the anti-  
Japanese riots of January 1974, while  
then Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka was vis-  
iting Indonesia.

#### THE PROFILE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT

Between 1967 and 1979, approved foreign  
investment came to \$7.1 billion. Imple-  
mented or realized investment totalled  
\$3.4 billion, \$2.2 billion or 65 percent  
of which went into the rapidly growing  
manufacturing sector. Among investors, Ja-  
pan was clearly in the lead, accounting  
for \$2.5 billion or almost 36 percent,  
followed by the U.S., with \$800 million  
or 11 percent. Indicative of the strong  
position that foreign investors have  
gained in the economy is that they now  
outstrip state enterprises in total manu-  
facturing output, 21 to 20 percent. For-  
eign firms today dominate such sectors as  
beverages, leather footwear, derivative  
chemical products, glass and glass prod-  
ucts, non-ferrous metal, and electrical  
machinery. Measured in terms of output per  
firm, foreign firms are, on average, more  
than twice as large as state firms and  
more than seven times as large as domestic  
firms. Their productive capacity does not,  
however, match their employment capabili-  
ty, since they account for only one-tenth  
of the 683,000 people employed in manu-  
facturing.

#### DECLINE IN NEW INVESTMENT

Despite the currently strong position of  
foreign investors, the Bank is worried  
about the future. Compared to the period  
1970 to 1974, it points out, the inflow of  
new approved investment fell by 34 per-  
cent. Excluding investment going to the  
huge Asahan aluminum smelter project, the  
decline was even sharper at 77 percent.

"Many businessmen indicated to the Mis-  
sion that were it not for the regulatory  
environment, the cost of producing manu-  
factured goods in Indonesia could be the  
lowest in Southeast Asia," the Bank in-  
forms the government. It continues: "De-  
spite recent restrictions, foreign inves-  
tors still believe that Indonesia with its  
large population as potential customers  
makes it an attractive place for long-term  
investment, but there is less unanimity as  
to whether it will remain so if current  
trends continue." It then tells the gov-  
ernment that "the incentives for these  
firms to locate there rather than in some  
other Southeast Asian country... must be  
provided."

A constant concern in the report is the  
institution of illegal payments "which are  
the most effective way to expedite af-  
fairs." Special concern is evinced over  
the inability of U.S. firms to compete in  
this area because they are severely re-  
stricted from making illegal payments by  
U.S. law. It notes, however, that to get  
around the law, American firms have re-  
sorted to "expeditors" or "forwarding  
agents". An interesting example is pro-  
vided by the Bank:

"One manager of an American firm com-  
plained of the time and effort required  
on his part merely for the identifica-  
tion of the tariff classifications of  
imported items and for assessment of the  
applicable rate of duty. As manager of  
an American firm, he is unable to use  
illegal payments to speed up the clear-  
ing time and to have the applicable  
duties on his imports reduced. His in-  
ability to produce in Indonesia on equal  
terms with his competitors has been par-  
ticularly frustrating to him as most of  
them have been paying only 30 percent of  
the duties and tax for the majority of  
the inputs they all import... inclusive  
illegal payments. Consequently, he has  
been using expeditors to deal with cus-  
toms. The expeditors serve more than a  
single purpose for this manager. First,

they pay on his behalf, certain kinds of individuals." bribes, for example, to reduce the clearance time. Second, as the forwarding agents are well-connected with high-ranking Indonesians, they serve as this manager's contacts with powerful Indonesians."

#### RADICAL RESTRUCTURING

The Bank's solution to what it sees as an increasingly unfavorable investment climate is nothing less than a radical restructuring of industry through a "comprehensive program of deregulation and elimination of market interventions." Among the proposals that immediately affect foreign investment, are the following:

1. "The DSP (investment priorities list) system should... be significantly amended and no prohibition be placed on any properly registered... foreign firm from entering or expanding any business activity producing legal commodities or services."

2. Exploitation of natural resources like copper, tin and timber, which is currently curbed, should be opened up to foreign investors. "The interest of society, at large, as opposed to particular individuals with ownership rights in particular firms," says the Bank, "is to have these resources managed in the most efficient way so as to obtain the highest returns possible in terms of the resources generated through royalties or taxes on firms to exploit these resources."

3. Restrictions on the use of foreign workers should be relaxed. Indeed, the Bank advocates "a clear policy of unrestricted access to high-level personnel from abroad..." Even restrictions on lower-level foreign personnel should be relaxed on the following grounds: "While foreign firms may rely on foreign workers to fill high-level positions, this cost tends to be offset by relatively greater expenditure on training local workers at lower levels."

4. Restrictions on ownership, such as the provision that 51 percent of a firm's equity must pass to Indonesian hands after a specified number of years, should be relaxed, partly because "foreign firms that are protecting production or managerial secrets will not invest in areas where their control of this knowledge is threatened by forcing controlling ownership shares to be transferred to local firms or

5. Foreign firms should be allowed access to domestic credit. To justify what is certain to be one of its most controversial proposals, the Bank says that "in a country like Indonesia where the central problem is the efficient use rather than the mobilization of resources, there is little justification for imposing restrictions on financing that limit the process of private foreign investment."

#### RETURN TO LAISSEZ-FAIRE

These drastic prescriptions for foreign investment are part of a "liberalization package" that the Bank hopes will establish "a close approximation of free trade." The abolishment of the quantitative import restrictions as well as protective tariffs that shelter Indonesian firms from multinational competition is strongly recommended. This is, of course, what is popularly known as the "Chilean Solution," after Chilean dictator Pinochet's radical dismantling of protective tariffs after the military coup of 1973. What the Bank doesn't mention are the costs of such politics. In the case of Chile, for example, a recent study by the widely respected Chilean economist Ricardo French Davis asserts that the tariff reform imposed by Pinochet's "Chicago Boys" has led to the bankruptcy of almost 1,600 Chilean companies and to a condition of industrial stagnation that has, so far, cost the country about \$8.5 billion.<sup>3</sup> Being even less secure than Chile's relatively more established and mature entrepreneurial class, Indonesia's struggling local bourgeoisie would likely experience a disaster of greater magnitude if liberalization were to take place.

#### EXPORT-LED INDUSTRIALIZATION

In addition to the free flow of foreign investment and trade liberalization, the Bank proposes as the third major prong of its strategy of industrial reform the re-orientation of industry from "import substitution" to production for export. Indonesia must specialize in the production and export of labor intensive light manufactures, says the Bank, which is in its "comparative advantage" to do because it is "well-endowed" with unskilled labor. Production for the domestic market must

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be downgraded in the process. The Bank provides the following rationale for this: "... the domestic market in Indonesia is, at present, small in terms of purchasing power... and is unlikely to support a high growth rate in the manufacturing sector. Indonesia must, therefore, become more outward-looking than it is at present."

Again, what the Bank conveniently avoids mentioning are the costs of its prescription. In most areas where it has been adopted as the path to industrial growth, "export-led industrialization" is running into severe problems. In the late sixties and seventies, under the strong advice of the World Bank, countries like Brazil, South Korea, and the Philippines turned away from "import-substitution industrialization," which had been blocked from further advance by the limits of the internal market. The solution was clear: the market could only be enlarged by the redistribution of income. Such a solution would, however, have necessitated a social revolution that would have swept away the World Bank together with foreign interests and local privileged groups in these countries. Concentrating on producing labor-intensive light manufactures for the markets of advanced industrial countries appeared to provide a way to foster industrial growth without having to redistribute income. This benefit, however, has now proven to be illusory, since economic stagnation and a wave of protectionism in the advanced capitalist countries are rapidly reducing opportunities for light manufactures from the Third World and forcing the various "export platforms" into cut-throat competition with one another.

The perils of export-led growth were, in fact, articulated by World Bank President Robert McNamara himself in 1974, at the same time that he was proclaiming it "the wave of the future" for the developing world: "The adverse effect on the developing countries of... a reduction in economic growth in their major markets would be great. There is a strong - almost one-to-one - relationship between changes in the growth rate of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries and that of the oil-importing nations. This is not surprising. Exports to OECD countries constitute 75 percent of the total exports of those nations. A di-

minished growth rate in the OECD countries translates very quickly into reduced demand for those developing nations' exports, leading in turn to a reduced capacity to import, and hence to lower rates of growth."<sup>4</sup> McNamara's fears have become reality. Indonesia, the Bank itself notes, has recently been hit by quotas imposed by the European Economic Community on its textile exports to the United Kingdom in 1980.

That foreign multinationals will be at the vanguard of "export-led industrialization" is hardly concealed by the Bank. It is precisely those labor-intensive sectors, such as textiles, leather footwear, and wood products, in which foreign firms have gained a strong, if not commanding position that should be encouraged to go into export promotion. Moreover, the Bank proposes the establishment of "export-processing zones" similar to those now existing in South Korea, Hong Kong and the Philippines. These are areas where multinationals can have access to

The secret World Bank documents on Indonesia (as well as those on the Philippines - see the latest issue of Counter-Spy) clearly illustrate that the Bank's primary task is the promotion of U.S. corporate interests in Third World countries and not, as the Bank likes to say, assistance to poor countries. This was even acknowledged by a high ranking Bank official in a recent interview. He said confidentially that the Bank recently initiated a major study on how to "reorient itself by 180 degrees back to the point of assisting the poor of the world." The study is being conducted by William Ascher - the very person who had drafted the secret World Bank document on the means of continuing and expanding exploitation through Bank programs in the Philippines. Ascher is working at the World Bank under a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) pro bono publico grant which - bless his heart - pays him \$1 a year. The Council, together with the CIA, played a major role in the 1965 military coup in Indonesia that left over half a million dead. It will be interesting to read (if they are not classified) William Ascher's recommendations for serving the world's poor and the public good.

cheap labor without the burden of import or export taxes. "The benefits to firms," says the Bank, "would arise from the low cost of available labor, the proposed infrastructure and plant facilities, and the visible assurance to domestic and foreign investors that they will be free to export and import without any institutional constraints..."

#### WESTERN VS. JAPANESE CAPITAL

Though seemingly directed towards promoting foreign capital as a whole, the document is actually expressing the viewpoint of U.S. and other Western firms in their competition with Japanese capital. This is obliquely confirmed by one member of the mission, who informed the Southeast Asia Resource Center that, "most managers interviewed were either American or European. Japanese interviewed tended to be less forthright and often tended to express a positive view toward the foreign investment regime."

Japanese firms have gained an overwhelming foothold in Indonesia because of their well-known "flexibility" in dealing with Indonesian interest groups like the military. Joint ventures with Indonesians - a system in which the Japanese have become quite adept - draws the fire of the Bank, which says that "local participation represents little more than a payment to a local company for acting as a front to obtain a concession. Much of the capital for these local fronts", asserts the Bank, "is actually risk capital provided by the foreign partner or foreign producer which can maintain control of the company, even after it has theoretically passed into domestic Indonesian ownership, through long-term management or supply contracts."

Local partners, the report states, are drawn from a narrow circle of high-income groups. "A study of ownership patterns in Indonesian industry shows that several hundred of the largest industrial concerns are partially owned by high-level Government officials or their immediate families." Rather than encouraging these Indonesians to make careers in business, joint ventures, concludes the Bank, push them into "developing their connections and maximizing their returns as front men."

Seen in this light, the World Bank report on Indonesia represents a significant move in the sharpening conflict between

U.S. and Japanese capital for control of the biggest national market in what is now regarded as the world's premier economic growth area, Southeast Asia.

#### FOOTNOTES

- 1) Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are from the World Bank document, Selected Issues of Industrial Development and Trade Strategy, October 29, 1980.
- 2) Pacific Asia Resource Center, "Japanese Transnational Enterprises in Indonesia", AMPO, vol.12 no.4, 1980, p.4. This excellent resource provides a comprehensive look at Japanese investment in Indonesia.
- 3) Elizabeth Fransworth and Stephen Talbot, "Dispatches", The Nation, Jan.31, 1981, p.103.
- 4) Robert McNamara, Address to Board of Governors, 1974, Washington, D.C., 1974, p.12.

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# Afghanistan: Foreign Intervention and the Prospects for Peace

by Mohammed Sarkash  
and Seamus O'Faolain

(Ed. note: Mohammed Sarkash and Seamus O'Faolain are pseudonyms for an Afghan and a U.S. writer, respectively.)

From its beginning in April 1978, the Afghan revolution has been under heavy attack from two circles. First, conservative Western regimes - newly alarmed by the upheavals in Iran - were awakened to the reality that revolutionary movements were gaining strength in other countries of the region. Second, reactionary and privileged forces (especially the landowners) within Afghanistan were stirred into reaction. The circle of Afghan reaction found support in conservative Western circles, and the two circles quickly became concentric (with the Afghan revolution the common center of their offensive). CounterSpy has analyzed the evolution of external opposition to the Afghan government. (See Oct.-Dec., 79; Jan.-March 80; and April-June 80.) The purpose of this article is to examine the combined impact of these external and internal forces on the revolution and the prospects for peace.

## THE FACES OF WAR

Of the literally dozens of rebel groupings clamoring for recognition, only the six headquartered in Peshawar, Pakistan have succeeded in receiving sizable external assistance and in infiltrating substantial quantities of arms and trained fighters into Afghanistan. While the focus of this article will be on these groups - their roots, goals, and external support from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, the U.S., China and Western Europe - mention will also be made of smaller operations by Iran and other countries.

Careful study of the six major Peshawar groupings reveals that these groups stand no chance of victory, nor of significant, unified popular support due to their divisions, extreme fundamentalist positions (even in the eyes of some of their supporters) and lack of logistical sophistication. Their prestige is further weakened by the fact that at least two of the six were initially created and financed entirely by external forces as early as

1973. Most foreign governments and groups who have sent aid to the rebels, understand these weaknesses and the futility, in military terms, of their support. Their assistance is not motivated by military goals but rather by political ones. In the propaganda war against the Soviet Union, the United States and its Middle East allies reap tremendous political capital from keeping Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Some seem determined to continue doing so, even if it means fighting to the last Afghan.

At the current level of fighting, however, "the last Afghan" still has quite a while to go. Even Drew Middleton of the New York Times, with his rebel Afghan news sources, ventured the estimate that "no more than 1,000 rebels are in contact with the Soviet forces at one time on any day and their effectiveness is limited."<sup>1</sup> Two Westerners who travelled in Afghanistan in late 1980 (Fred Halliday and Gerard Chaliand)<sup>2</sup> reported that the main Afghan towns are secured against any serious rebel threat, with military cordons established around them. Significantly, the rebels' major victories emerge in non-military arenas, as Halliday reports: "Over one hundred schools have been destroyed in Herat province alone, and present diplomatic sources confirm that around half of all the educational and medical facilities in the Afghan countryside have been destroyed by the rebels this year." Soviet casualties are also systematically trumped-up by rebel sources and even Chaliand, who was travelling with the rebels, admitted: "Contrary to periodic reports from 'diplomatic sources' (usually in New Delhi), the Soviets have suffered remarkably few casualties in the year since the invasion."

The Pakistani-based rebels actually comprise only a very narrow sliver of the million-plus Afghan refugees. Another recent visitor to Afghanistan, reporting for the Boston Globe, estimated from his observations of thriving black markets and knowledge of embezzled refugee aid that over half of the refugees were "economic opportunists":<sup>3</sup>



"In a 500-mile journey from inside Afghanistan through Baluchistan and the frontier, most fellow passengers were Afghan refugees. But they did not have any tales to tell of Soviet bombings or fierce resistance in the hills. They simply wanted to seek a new life in Pakistan. At the border town of Qamruddin Karez in Baluchistan, local government officials were openly skeptical of guerrilla war efforts and dismissed most of the refugees as economic opportunists." Dotted through the opportunists and black marketeers, at uneven intervals, are training camps of predominantly Sunni, Pashto-speaking rebels from the eastern Afghan provinces, loyal to one of the following six leaders.

#### ISLAMIC PARTY OF GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR

Hekmatyar is considered the most uncompromising and fundamentalist of the rebel leaders. While a student in the engineering faculty of the University of Kabul, he belonged to the Jawanan-i-Musalman (Militant Muslim Youth), a group with close links to the pan-Islamic Muslim Brotherhood. He was known for his attacks on female education and was arrested in the early 1970s for assassinating a progressive Afghan student. Gaining notoriety while in jail, he was released in late 1972.

Hekmatyar's group, now known as the Islamic Party (Hezb-i Islami), has its roots in an earlier era. In 1973, when Muhammad Daud assumed power in Afghanistan in an anti-royalist coup, the government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Pakistan launched a "forward policy" against Afghanistan. Out of fear that Daud would reignite the long-standing border dispute over the Pashtunistan regions of the two countries, Pakistan clandestinely trained and armed a force of 5,000 Afghan rebels in a series of secret camps. The Nixon administration, fearful that Daud's regime was too left-leaning, sent in the CIA to help Pakistan train these rebels. (One CIA training camp was located in Attock, Pakistan.) The CIA later withdrew assistance as it became clear that Daud wasn't a leftist, and the force was put under tight Pakistani control, with Hekmatyar emerging as the Afghan "leader". Pakistan hoped to use the force to counter any Daud attempts to militarily push into the North West Fron-

tier Province of Pakistan and also as a pressure ploy to force the Afghan government to recognize a British-drawn border (known as the Durand line) that was advantageous to Pakistan as the official border between the two countries.

These rebels were subsequently used quite effectively to Pakistan's advantage. In July 1975, the 5,000 man force, under Hekmatyar's command, was infiltrated into the Panjsher valley north of Kabul for a major battle against Afghan government forces. The battle was effective in pushing Afghanistan onto the defensive in the ensuing negotiations. While the Pakistani government denied any connection with the incident at the time, former high officials in the Bhutto government have recently admitted their involvement.<sup>4</sup> Even after Bhutto was overthrown by General Zia ul-Haq in July 1977, Pakistan continued to supply Hekmatyar with training facilities, such as a camp at Warsack, as well as the right to run his own prisons and military tribunals.

Hekmatyar's Islamic Party has proclaimed a detailed set of goals, which clearly identify it as the most obscurantist and "anti-progressive" of the rebel groups. The first principle of the party is explicit in this respect: "Afghanistan is an exclusively Islamic state where all non-Islamic ideas or practices are forbidden."<sup>5</sup> A sense of the program is seen in the following four proposals: (1) the agrarian reform launched by the revolutionary government will be cancelled and all private property will be returned to its original owners; (2) women must wear the veil and both education and work will be separated by sex; (3) all education will include military training for jihad (holy war) and the state will undertake massive military armament; and (4) (in contrast to present policy of respecting the several national languages) there will be one national language and Arabic will be promoted as a second language.<sup>6</sup>

Despite Hekmatyar's prominence among Peshawar-based rebels, he has been one of the most divisive forces in the rebel movement. He has refused to join any rebel alliances and his group has been involved in outbreaks of fighting against other rebel groups.

Hekmatyar's major external provider is still Pakistan, which supplies abundant aid, facilities and freedom to move men

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and arms at will. Unlike Bhutto's government, which helped create the rebel force in 1973 principally for anti-Daud government actions, Zia's support comes also from an ideological affinity with Hekmatyar. The joint CIA-Pakistan creation of the Hekmatyar-led force in 1973 was by no means the last instance of close collaboration between the U.S. and Pakistan.

CounterSpy (Jan.- March 80) has extensively described Pakistani compliance with the CIA's use of the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan to direct covert assistance to the rebels. More recently, in September 1980, the Pakistani government ordered all diplomatic missions to stop operating information and publicity sections from cities other than Islamabad. It was no accident that U.S. International Communication Agency posts in Lahore, Karachi and Peshawar were not affected by the order. Since late 1980, the Islamic Party has also been financially helped by the leader of the Islamic Society Party of Kuwait, Abdullah al Aqil.

Since the April 1978 revolution, four major groups have split off from Hekmatyar, but all continue to espouse basically the same ideas and programs: Islamic Party (Hezb-i-Islami, a direct split from Hekmatyar's party which kept the name) of Younis Khalis; Islamic Society of Afghanistan (Jamiat Islami Afghanistan) of Burhanuddin Rabani; National Liberation Front of Afghanistan (Jabha-i-Nejat-i-Milli Afghanistan) of Sebgatullah Mujadidi; and Islamic Revolutionary Movement (Harakat Inqelabe Islami) of Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. Along with a fifth group (to be detailed later), they formed a flimsy Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan under the leadership of Abdul Rasoul Sayaf (who was freed from jail by Karmal in January 1980).

There are marked differences in the leaders' backgrounds. Rabani, Mujadidi and Sayaf were all educated at the Theological University of Al Azhar (Cairo, Egypt) as theologians. All three formed connections with the Muslim Brotherhood while in Egypt. Upon their return to Kabul, each became involved with the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Militant Muslim Youth (as did Hekmatyar and Mohammadi). In contrast to the engineer Hekmatyar, Rabani was a landlord and businessman, involved in the export of Karakul (Persian fur). Similarly, Mujadidi was a landlord in Afghani-

stan, and in the mid-1970s was appointed (under a Saudi grant) to a mosque in Copenhagen. Prominent members of his family earlier became notorious for their excessively conservative opposition to the Afghan monarchy from the 1920s onward.<sup>7</sup> When the first Afghan parliament was elected in 1965, the most reactionary block of representatives was led by the Mujadidi family.

Rabani's modern rebel activities began alongside Hekmatyar in the Pakistan-CIA-created Afghan rebel group in 1973. The others only came to Peshawar after the 1978 Afghan revolution and subsequent land reform. Even now, the established Muslim group whose principles all of these leaders seem to adhere to most closely is the Muslim Brotherhood - an extreme fundamentalist organization with cells all over the Middle East which rejects all forms of "Westernization, secularization and modernization" (see box).

*Selig Harrison, a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment, arguing in Foreign Policy (Winter 80-81) that U.S. aid be redirected to rebel groups within Afghanistan, clearly pointed to the political liability of the Muslim Brotherhood link: "Most of the Peshawar-based resistance groups espouse the militant, fundamentalist variety of pan-Islamism identified with the Muslim Brotherhood. Operating throughout the Islamic world, the brotherhood denies the importance, even the validity, of a separate Afghan or Pakistani or Arab nationalism, emphasizing instead the unity of Islam. For this reason, among others, Afghan fundamentalist leaders have been isolated from the mainstream of Afghan political life in recent decades and, consequently, have had difficulty in winning acceptance as resistance leaders." Founded in 1928 in Egypt, the Brotherhood rapidly spread throughout Egypt, the Sudan, Syria, Palestine, Lebanon and North Africa, and amassed 200,000 members organized in tight local cells within a decade. In demanding "purity" of the Islamic world, they have long rejected any foreign influence through secularization or modernization. Since being driven underground in Egypt in the 1950s, the Brotherhood has focused its activities on terrorist attacks against the less fundamentalist regimes in the region.*

As early as January 1980, then-Egyptian Defense Minister, General Kamal Hassan Ali announced that "army camps have been opened for the training of Afghan rebels" and that (Peshawar-based) rebels are being supplied with weapons from Egypt.<sup>8</sup> These shipments continue to the present, with the open complicity of the Pakistani government. A French reporter, who travelled with rebel groups for six months in 1980, tracked an April 1980 shipment of Egyptian arms from the moment it arrived in Pakistan all the way into Afghanistan. A complete list of the arms of the shipment (including Egyptian-made kalachnikov rifles, explosives, rocket propelled grenades, cartridges, mines and shells) was stamped with official government seals at several checkpoints in Pakistan. Then, the French reporter personally accompanied a truckload of the arms through the final Pakistan border station into Afghanistan. Just across the border the arms were dispersed by camel and man into the interior.<sup>9</sup> A June 1980 issue of the New Republic asserted that some of the Egyptian weapons also entered Pakistan in weekly plane flights.

In December 1980, representatives of four of the five Alliance groups personally visited Sadat in his home village of Mit-a-Abul-Qom. Sadat suggested to the leaders that they form a government in exile: "I would be very happy to learn that you have reached agreement on the formation of a provisional government."<sup>10</sup> He also promised he would double the aid he had already sent to the rebels, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. Within three weeks, there were reports that new rocket propelled grenades and 12.9 mm heavy machine guns from Egypt were deployed in the fighting.<sup>11</sup> It has been reported that the arms Sadat has supplied to the Alliance are divided roughly into five equal parts in Peshawar and distributed to the five "partners" that comprise the Alliance.<sup>12</sup>

The details of U.S. involvement in the Egyptian rebel assistance are unknown. However, it should be recalled that one of the largest U.S. aid program in the world is to Egypt, running at more than \$1 billion annually. At the onset of 1981, Egypt had a \$3.5 billion commitment in U.S. arms sales.<sup>13</sup> Clearly, Egypt is able to send some of its older arms to Afghan rebels precisely because it is receiving abundant

new arms shipments from the U.S. In light of this dependent Sadat-U.S. relationship, it is highly doubtful that Egyptian arms end up in Afghan rebel hands without at least tacit approval from the U.S.

Rabani's Islamic Society of Afghanistan also receives generous covert support through one of the United States' most loyal clients in the Middle East - Oman (for more on Oman, see the February-April 1981 issue of CounterSpy). Money for arms and military equipment has been transferred from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia into the Bank of Oman account of Tufail Mohammed, one of Rabani's associates in the Islamic Society.

#### NATIONAL FRONT FOR ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF SAYED AHMAD GAILANI

Gailani's group is the final member of the Islamic Alliance, and is unique in its open support for the restoration of the Afghan monarchy. Gailani's roots also differ from his Alliance co-members in that his father was an Iraqi religious figure who settled in Afghanistan before World War I. After his father was hanged for his opposition to Afghan independence in 1919, Gailani amassed great wealth through landholdings, farms and tribute paid by nomads who revered him as a son of a great religious leader (he is addressed as "Pir", a title of a high religious figure). In the 1970s, he also prospered as a businessman, becoming the sole distributor of Peugeot cars in Afghanistan. Through his wife he is related to the former King of Afghanistan (who now lives in Rome).

Gailani launched his National Front for Islamic Revolution (Maaz-i-Milli Islami) soon after the 1978 revolution, drawing heavily on his support among the nomads. The Front's Manifesto reveals a stance more liberal than that of Hekmatyar.<sup>14</sup> Its avowed fundamentalist principles are "Islam, nationalism and democracy" and it even makes a gesture toward equality of the sexes. Despite its "modernist" language, however, the Manifesto is firmly opposed to any kind of agrarian reform. Gailani's somewhat liberal rhetoric has frequently provoked open rifts within the Alliance. When he went to Western Europe seeking arms for the insurgents, Abdul Rasoul Sayah, president of the Alliance, criticized the effort as being "too Western" and issued a statement disassociating the Alliance from it.<sup>15</sup>

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In addition to Gailani's Egyptian support (via the Alliance), he has received strong Saudi Arabian financial assistance. The Saudis favor his monarchist sympathies and have issued Saudi passports to members of the ex-King's royal family in Italy. Gailani maintains a residence in both London and Peshawar. In June 1980, he met in London with Douglas Hurd, a high official in the Foreign Office as well as other officials in an attempt to get arms. Two months later, it was disclosed in Britain's Sunday Telegraph that some of the weapons Britain had sold to Arab countries were being redirected to the Afghan rebels.

#### IRAN AND CHINA

While the Iranian government has been far more unbending than Pakistan in its verbal condemnation of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, it has been less acquiescent of supporting rebel activities from its territory. In June 1980, Iranian authorities banned Iran-based activities of Rabani's Islamic Society of Afghanistan, claiming to have evidence that the group had ties to the CIA and Israeli and Egyptian intelligence agencies. Iran also said that Rabani's followers were smuggling heroin and were supplying arms and money to counter-revolutionary groups in Iran.

Iran's Baluchi minority, on the other hand, began in late 1978 to provide weapons, medical supplies and money to Afghan Baluchi forces. The support was coordinated by Mawlawi Abdol-Aziz Mollazadeh, religious leader of the half million Sunni Moslem Baluchis, and his Iranian Ettihadol Moslemin Party.<sup>16</sup> The Afghan Baluchi leader is Mohammad Sharif. Rebels of the Shi'ite Hazara minority have also sent representatives to, and received support from, sympathetic Iranian groups.

In the northern, northeastern and central sections of Afghanistan, the Tadjik, Uzbek and Hazara rebel movements have been supported militarily by China.<sup>17</sup> This is in addition to Chinese advisors and military supplies sent to rebel training camps in Pakistan. In early 1981, however, China announced that in focusing on its own economic development, it was vastly cutting back on its aid to both Third World governments and liberation movements (which is what it considers the Afghan rebels to be). It cannot be determined yet

One of the U.S. organizations that is openly collecting money for the Afghan rebels is the Boulder, Colorado based Afghan Freedom Fighters Fund, which was started by Soldier of Fortune (SoF) magazine publisher Robert Brown. Its P.O. Box number is the same as the box of SoF's advertising department. The Fund's advertisement, prominently featured on SoF's back cover, reads: "Buy a Bullet, Zap a Russian Invader... All funds collected will be donated to an Afghan resistance group selected by the SoF staff. These funds will be used to purchase arms, ammunition and medical supplies depending on the specific need of the Afghan resistance group receiving the funds."

Several SoF reporters have gone to Peshawar and claim to have joined up with rebel groups and gone into Afghanistan. Recent issues of SoF are full of their bragging about their experiences in Afghanistan. (The May 1981 issue also has a photo of Mashmet Mojadidi, whose father heads the National Liberation Front of Afghanistan, posing with a Chinese assault rifle.)

Three mercenaries who said they are members of the SoF-connected "Wild Geese" mercenary association, recently arrived in Pakistan to support the Afghan rebels. They claimed to be "the vanguard of a contingent of 72." The three gave their names as Walter John Pilgrin, Robin Hugh Morrison (both are British) and Eugene Trajan Shipley, a U.S. citizen. Pilgrin (who said he was a mercenary in the Congo and in "Rhodesia") and Morrison (he says he was a mercenary in the French Foreign Legion and in Angola) said they wanted "to kill Russians."

Several other members of the "Wild Geese" have been in and out of Peshawar in recent months. Some of them claimed they had been hired by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture and bring out specific Soviet military equipment from Afghanistan. According to the London Observer (3/22/81), "they say the Americans find it convenient to employ Britons because they do not need visas to enter Pakistan. This story is partly confirmed by the fact that U.S. officials have certainly asked some freelance photographers to photograph instruments ..of downed helicopter gunships."

whether this has affected aid to the Afghan rebels.

#### OTHER ASSISTANCE

In Spring, 1980, CounterSpy detailed CIA assistance to Afghan rebels which began in late 1979. Only in mid-February 1980 did a senior National Security Council official admit that, with President Carter's approval, the U.S. was supplying arms to unspecified rebel groups.<sup>18</sup> One person with rebel connections, Zia Nassry (a U.S. citizen) met with high ranking U.S. officials and Senators during visits in 1979 and 1980.<sup>19</sup> Nassry later told an interviewer for the German magazine Der Spiegel that his followers had received training facilities in Egypt from Anwar Sadat.<sup>20</sup> Late in 1980, two Afghan rebel leaders, Sayed Bahaouddin Majrooh and Saduddin Shpoon), claiming to represent a wide spectrum of resistance fighters, met with State Department officials, a half dozen Senators and Henry Kissinger.<sup>21</sup>

Now, the question of escalating assistance falls squarely on the shoulders of Ronald Reagan's entourage. One of Reagan's top aides on the area is former Ambassador to Afghanistan, Robert Neumann, who clearly enunciates a confrontational approach to the Soviet Union. The Far Eastern Economic Review confidently reported after Reagan's inauguration that: "It is believed the U.S. will try to plug into their [Gailani, Khalis, Mohammadi and Mujadidi] groups with up to \$200 million in military and economic assistance."<sup>22</sup>

Other expressions of external aid have occurred on a much smaller scale. Typical is the Paris-based Friends of Afghanistan Society, which collects donations for the rebels via advertisements in French newspapers. They distributed the equivalent of U.S. \$45,000 to rebel leaders in June 1980.<sup>23</sup>

#### NATIONAL FATHERLAND FRONT

The Afghan government is striving to broaden and reinforce its rule through a series of national and international initiatives. If successful, the government says that there will be no further need for Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

The centerpiece of Babrak Karmal's national efforts was summarized in his December 1980 call for a "national fatherland front" to pull various political and

economic forces into the Afghan government. This is not the first time Karmal and the Parcham branch (which along with the Khalq branch makes up the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan - PDPA, of which Karmal was a principal founder) have issued such an appeal; indeed, they began doing so over 15 years earlier when Karmal was elected for the first of his two terms in Afghanistan's National Assembly.<sup>24</sup> When the PDPA held its first congress in January 1965, it called for "an alliance of workers, peasants, progressive intellectuals, artisans, urban and rural smallholders and national bourgeois in one front" to liberate Afghanistan from its backwardness.<sup>25</sup> Two years later, when Khalq and Parcham split, it was Karmal's Parcham branch which continued to advocate a broad front to carry through the first stage of a national and democratic revolution.

The idea of a broad front was still a central aim of the PDPA after it assumed power in April, 1978, but it receded into the background as divisions grew between Khalq and Parcham. Any hope for such a front was further squelched by certain miscalculations and errors by the government. These included an at times brutal

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CIA Director William Casey's mission to Japan in early 1981 was supposed to be secret until - probably by mistake - his name appeared on the visitors list of Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki. Japanese spokespersons said this was the first official level mission between a CIA Director and an incumbent Japanese Prime Minister. Casey refused to speak with reporters, and U.S. representatives in Tokyo did not comment on the visit either. However, Japanese officials told the Washington Post that Casey had asked Suzuki to give more aid to Thailand and Pakistan. Pressured by the U.S., Japan had agreed in early 1980 to give Pakistan "an extra aid package" to help the Pakistani government "cope with the refugee problem." According to KYODO news agency, Suzuki promised to step up his aid to Zia ul-Haq once more. It was seen as unusual, however, that a U.S. CIA Director would get involved in the issue of foreign aid between Japan and Pakistan.

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## Reagan and the Rebels

While the Carter administration sent aid to the Afghan rebels without talking about it very much, Ronald Reagan and his cabinet are fairly open about it. Referring to the rebels, Reagan stated in an interview with ABC News on March 8, 1981: "They are freedom fighters, not rebels... Those are people fighting for their own country and not wanting to be a satellite of the Soviet Union." He announced that he "would consider supplying American weapons to the Afghan rebels" and added that he didn't think the Soviet government "could really have an objection to that."

Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger immediately echoed Reagan's views in an interview with "Face the Nation" (CBS). Weinberger was asked whether providing supplies to the rebels would deter the Soviet Union from "other adventures." He said: "Anything that would discourage Soviet adventurism would be profitable," but a policy of giving arms to the Afghan rebels can "only succeed if it were acceptable to the... rebels... We cannot force our presence anywhere it is not desired unless war is actually under way."

It is hard to believe that Weinberger does not know that a number of Afghan rebel leaders have in fact repeatedly asked for outside aid, and over the last year, several of them have visited the U.S. In February 1981, a rebel delegation headed by Ahmad Gailani, son of Zayed Ahmad Gailani (the New York Times reported that Gailani Senior, the leader of the National Front for Islamic Revolution himself had come to Washington) and Hakim Aryobi, who was described as a field commander of the front, visited the U.S. to ask for arms. National Public Radio (All Things Considered) aired the following interview with Gailani Junior on February 26.

Gailani: We are not here to seek manpower... What we need is ammunition, guns for our cause, as well as food and medicine."

NPR: Have people been receptive to your request?

G.: We are very happy about... the results of our trip.

NPR: Have there been specific guarantees offered?

G.: It is very difficult to say. I think it's a good sign that we have been received here very well.

NPR: Received by whom?

G.: We met some Senators, some Congressmen, and some... high ranking officials.

NPR: But you don't want to tell us who any of these high ranking officials are?

G.: I prefer not to speak specifically.

NPR: But you're happy, quite happy with what you have been told.

G.: Yes.

Reagan's openness about U.S. aid to the "freedom fighters" constitutes somewhat of a change in U.S. policy on Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, increased aid will prolong the fighting in Afghanistan. In talking about stepping up aid, Reagan is following the advice of two leading capitalist media outlets: the Economist, which editorialized late last year that "certainly the west should help the guerrillas..." and the Wall Street Journal, which praised some "rebel delegates" visiting the U.S. as being "not... primitive Islamic fanatics" but "supremely Western educated." Referring to problems in aiding the rebels, the Journal argues that none of them is "insurmountable... especially when we are engaged in an enterprise that doesn't require of us a complete success." In other words - the U.S. objective is not to lead the rebels to victory, but just to provide enough arms to the "freedom fighters" to keep them going.

It is unlikely that Pakistan's General Zia ul-Haq was happy about Reagan's open discussion of U.S. aid to the rebels - which has to go through Pakistan - since the rebel presence in his country is further destabilizing Zia's shaky rule. Some Pakistani officials say increased U.S. aid to Pakistan would not provide enough benefits to offset the problems resulting from an increased U.S. commitment to the rebels and their continued presence in Pakistan. However, given Pakistan's huge debt to U.S. controlled international lending institutions (in November 1980, for example, Zia was forced to accept a \$1.7 billion IMF loan under terms disastrous for the country's poor), the last word might not have been spoken on this issue.

- by Konrad Ege -

implementation of progressive reforms (e.g. land reform, literacy campaign, female education, etc.); a rigid and often authoritarian party structure; and concentration of decision-making in the hands of Pashto-speaking Afghans to the exclusion of certain minorities. These mistakes especially provoked the Hazara and Nuristani minorities (which were initially sympathetic to the revolution) to form substantial internal resistance movements. Also during this period, numerous small Maoist and other "left-wing" parties launched uncoordinated anti-government actions.

Babrak Karmal, who had been vice-premier in the 1978 revolutionary government, put a renewed emphasis on the idea of a front when he assumed power in December 1979. Karmal carried the front concept a step further in his December 1980 speech by sanctioning the convening of a "constituent congress." He was careful to include "religious forces" among the many groups that would comprise the congress. The government has buttressed its nationalistic appeals for the front by de-emphasizing its socialist orientation, cutting back the land reform and even allowing some former landlords to return to certain areas.<sup>26</sup> Combined with a general unpopularity of the Peshawar rebels' jihad against modernism and communism, this policy has yielded some results. As one Indian journalist commented, "a surprising number of religious leaders are beginning to cooperate with the Karmal government despite their distrust of it."<sup>27</sup> There has also been some movement among pre-1978 government officials and other Afghans outside the country toward the idea of participating in a broad front.

Success of any such front will require an extraordinary degree of flexibility by the Afghan government. To date, they have taken initial steps that suggest such flexibility exists.

#### INTERNATIONAL PROSPECTS FOR PEACE

At the onset of 1981, eight months after Karmal announced a desire for talks with Pakistan and Iran, an international peace effort was launched from a surprising source: Pakistan. The central issue at stake is the sealing of borders by Pakistan and Iran to prevent rebel incursions into Afghanistan. Simultaneously, a timetable for Soviet troop withdrawal would

be created. On January 3, Pakistan's foreign minister Aga Shahi requested publicly that the United Nations Secretary General appoint a representative to convene peace discussions between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. He asked that Afghanistan be represented in the talks by the ruling People's Democratic Party and not the government - a condition which allowed Zia ul-Haq to distance himself from Babrak Karmal's government.

Even with this proviso, the move contained bold concessions on two fronts: for the first time there was no mention of rebel forces participating in the talks; and Pakistan agreed to meet openly with Babrak Karmal's party. Almost overnight, Afghanistan responded favorably, making an important concession in turn. Whereas Afghanistan had refused a U.N. role in peace talks, it now agreed to discussions under U.N. auspices or at least with U.N. observers.

The next act unfolded against the backdrop of a major Islamic conference in Taif, Saudi Arabia in late January 1981. Pakistan's General Zia met with U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to discuss concrete steps towards convening talks. Their discussion largely ignored the extremely vocal interventions of the Hezb-i-Islami rebel faction which demanded its inclusion in any settlement. Later at the conference, Pakistan's Shahi reportedly stated that talks could not wait for Iran, which was still insisting that Soviet troops leave and Afghan rebels be included before any peace could be considered.<sup>28</sup> Saudi Arabian officials claimed that only strong pressure from conservative Arab states prevented Zia from moving even faster towards talks.

At the February 1981 non-aligned foreign ministers conference in New Delhi, Afghan foreign minister Dost reiterated his desire for bilateral talks with Pakistan and with Iran (turning down Pakistan's proposals for trilateral talks). He stated that a U.N. presence at talks would be welcomed, but that the talks were not to be under U.N. auspices. The conference ended with no timetable set for talks and with a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan.

Zia's moves towards accommodation with Afghanistan are motivated by a series of rapidly accumulating pressures that threaten to topple his regime. On his

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eastern flank, long-time enemy India is just receiving several billion dollars worth of new Soviet military equipment. In 1980, Zia kept about two-thirds of his army of a quarter-million deployed in the east and north facing India. On the western border, the estimated one to one-and-a-half million Afghans in Pakistan are draining government coffers by \$200 million a year and are taking away vital resources from an already disaffected Baluchi population of 2.5 million.<sup>29</sup>

Growing Baluchi opposition to the government has found its counterpart in new activism of the Pakistan People's Party of ex-Prime Minister Bhutto (executed by Zia in 1979) and other anti-government organizations. A broad coalition of these parties, all banned by Zia, have demanded a normalization of relations with the Afghan government.<sup>30</sup> This coalition put heavy pressure on Zia in a series of 1981 demonstrations in Peshawar and Lahore which were continuing at the time of this writing (March 1981). It has also been reported that there is an underground cell of leftist People's Party activists in Kabul, where one of Bhutto's sons has also been seen.<sup>31</sup>

These military and political rumblings come at a time of growing economic crisis as Pakistan's external debt shot past \$10 billion in 1980.<sup>32</sup> Additional austerity drives forced on Zia by international banks and financial institutions could well further erode Gen. Zia's narrow political base. Zia realizes that every day that Soviet troops are in Afghanistan and rebel forces are in his country, the odds against him grow. His shift has been accelerated by Aga Shahi, who argues that Pakistan should ease away from close dependence on the U.S. to become a stalwart of the non-aligned movement. Shahi seems for the moment to have won majority support in the upper ruling echelons for this worldview, which implies seeking accommodation with Kabul.<sup>33</sup>

Forces attempting to break this policy apart are led by Pakistan Times editor Z. A. Suleri, who would rather accept Ronald Reagan's embrace and push for a multi-billion dollar aid package from the U.S. Suleri openly condemns both the non-aligned movement and the Islamic Conference and for a long time was considered Zia's mouthpiece. Suleri's hope is that Paki-

stan's need for the amounts of assistance that only the U.S. can offer will pull Zia back, to Washington's position and away from any accommodation with the Afghan government.

Proposals for negotiations with Pakistan and Iran have been accompanied by Afghan government efforts to extend its international support. The leader of a January 1981 trip to Afghanistan by three British Labor M.P.'s returned with the statement: "I generally support the Karmal government."<sup>34</sup> Significantly, the United States, which denies official recognition to governments of such countries as Angola, Cuba and Vietnam, still has an embassy and diplomatic personnel in Kabul. If Babrak Karmal is successful in broadening the political base of his government, the likelihood of further international recognition and a package including eventual withdrawal of Soviet forces will grow.

#### FOOTNOTES

- 1) International Herald Tribune (IHT), 12/27-28/80.
- 2) See their articles in the December, 1980 issues of New Statesman.
- 3) Boston Globe, 12/25/80.
- 4) Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), 1/30/81.
- 5) For the entire text see: Patrice Franceschi, Ils ont choisi la liberté, Arthaud, Paris, 1981.
- 6) Currently the two major languages are Dari (Persian) and Pashto, with Uzbek, Turkman and Baluchi close behind.
- 7) Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1973.
- 8) MENA (Cairo), as quoted in FBIS, Middle East and North Africa, 1/25/80.
- 9) Franceschi, pp.176, 177.
- 10) Times of India, 12/28/80.
- 11) IHT, 1/23/81 and FEER, 1/23/81.
- 12) Franceschi, p.176.
- 13) IHT, 1/20/81.
- 14) Reprinted in Franceschi, pp.260-263.
- 15) New York Times (NYT), 7/20/80.
- 16) NYT, 1/16/80.
- 17) Le Monde Diplomatique, February 1980.
- 18) NYT, 2/16/80.
- 19) Nassry went to Iran in early 1980 and was arrested in March 1980 on charges of spying. Two officials of the Swiss embassy in Teheran (which is taking care of U.S. interests there) visited Nassry in March 1981 in Evin Prison.
- 20) Der Spiegel, No.3, 1980.
- 21) Wall Street Journal (WSJ), 12/5/80.
- 22) FEER, 1/23/81.
- 23) FEER, 12/5/80.
- 24) Certain ideas of the PDPA find their roots in the first reformist government in Afghanistan (1919-1929), which was crushed by a revolt of reactionary religious forces. The ideas reemerged after World War II in demands by students and intellectuals for a parliamentary constitution and free elections. See Leon Poullada, Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929, Cornell, 1973.
- 25) Fred Halliday, "Revolution in Afghanistan", New Left Review, November-December 1978, p.22.



26) New Statesman, 12/5/80.

27) Guardian (London), 8/6/80.

28) IHT, 2/6/81.

29) Typical of these tensions is resentment over the roughly 2 million livestock the Afghans have brought into Baluchistan, which compete with local sheep for already scarce grazing land.

30) In February 1981, Pakistan's nine major opposition

political parties demanded Zia's resignation and formed an opposition alliance, the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy.

31) Boston Globe, 12/25/80.

32) NYT, 7/16/80.

33) see Financial Times, 2/10/81.


34) The Guardian Weekly (London), 1/18/81.

## U.S. Bases in Saudi Arabia by Konrad Ege

To simply say - as did the Chairperson of the House Committee on Europe and the Middle East, Lee Hamilton, in a recent hearing on Saudi Arabia - that "Saudi Arabia is a country of vital importance for the United States" <sup>1</sup> is quite an understatement. Of late, Saudi Arabia has been producing between 8.5 and 10.3 million barrels of oil per day - more than 13 percent of the total oil consumption in the capitalist world. Saudi oil constitutes about one quarter of total U.S. oil imports. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has become the seventh largest customer for U.S. exports. In a period of overall U.S. trade deficit, this exchange results in a net capital inflow into the U.S. From 1974 to 1978, for example, U.S. merchandise and military sales, export of U.S. services (from engineering to trash collection), oil company profits and dividends as well as Saudi investments in the U.S. resulted in a net inflow of \$5.1 billion per year. <sup>2</sup> Moreover, from 1955 to 1979, U.S. military sales agreements with Saudi Arabia totalled \$30.79 billion which was more than twice the value of foreign military sales to the shah of Iran in the same period as well as the highest amount of foreign military sales to any country in U.S. history.

Not surprisingly, Saudi Arabia has become the most ardent advocate of U.S. interests in OPEC (Saudi oil minister Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani works to keep OPEC prices down by increasing Saudi oil production far beyond Saudi needs and benefit) and in Muslim and Arab organizations. The Saudi rulers also use their wealth to fund arms purchases by other U.S. clients.

Because of these financial and strategic advantages of the present U.S.-Saudi relationship, the U.S. government chooses to ignore the extremely repressive character



of the several thousand princes who make up the Saudi royal family. Indeed, their - in Henry Kissinger's words - "strongly, vehemently and vociferously anti-Communist" <sup>4</sup> ideology fits in nicely with overall U.S. objectives in the region. The royal family uses their peculiar interpretation of the Koran as their ideology and justification of repression. Labor unions, political parties and even peaceful political and social assemblies are illegal. The curtailment of women's rights is extreme - they are barred from almost all jobs, cannot travel by themselves, and have no voice in public life. Saudi Arabia is one of the few countries in the world that does not have a constitution. The rule of the royal family is absolute.

There is only one issue on which the U.S. and Saudi Arabia disagree: Israel. The proclaimed Muslim nature of their regime forces the Saudi rulers to support the Palestinian movement. If the Reagan administration isn't able to find a speedy solution to the "problems of the Palestinians" (Reagan labeled the P.L.O. "terrorist"), the U.S.-Saudi alliance will expe-

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rience difficulties.

This article explores several aspects of the special nature of U.S.-Saudi relations by focusing on U.S. strategies to keep the economically powerful Saudi regime tied to the U.S. These strategies are rooted in the training and supplying of the Saudi military and National Guard who, in turn, suppress any movement for progressive change in Saudi Arabia. This, of course, also provides the U.S. control of the Saudi military and National Guard. As a General Accounting Office (G.A.O.) report put it: "... the substantial reliance on American advisors and technicians ... limits the potential use of the [Saudi] weapons against U.S. wishes." <sup>5</sup> Even some Saudi officials have acknowledged that U.S. military assistance is, in fact, used to keep Saudi Arabia dependent on the U.S. They question whether the U.S.-designed construction of huge military facilities benefits the U.S. more than Saudi Arabia, resulting in the existence of de facto U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia. Completing the U.S. hold on Saudi Arabia is the royal family's dependence on U.S. private security companies and the C.I.A. to maintain internal "stability."

#### THE ISSUE OF U.S. MILITARY BASES

Publicly, Saudi officials rule out any possibility of allowing U.S. military bases in their country, and occasionally even voice criticism of U.S. military actions in the region. At the same time, hundreds, if not thousands, of U.S. military personnel and over 10,000 civilian employees of U.S. defense contractors are in Saudi Arabia, and the government allows Saudi facilities to be used by the U.S. military. This contradiction between words and actions is obvious. The Saudi rulers are in a dilemma: they need the U.S. to maintain their regime, but they are wary of popular resentment and opposition to their identification with the U.S. government.

The U.S. military relationship with Saudi Arabia began during World War II. A U.S. military mission was established in Riyadh, and in 1944, the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) - then a joint venture of Standard Oil of California (Socal) and Texaco; Mobil and Jersey Standard Oil (now Exxon) joined in 1948 - "invited" the U.S. military to establish an air base near ARAMCO's oil fields. One

year before that, in February 1943, under pressure from Socal, President Franklin D. Roosevelt foreshadowed things to come by proclaiming that "the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States." <sup>6</sup> This made King Abdul Aziz eligible for \$17.5 million in U.S. aid between 1943 and 1946.

Not trusting the British, Abdul Aziz asked the U.S. government for a formal military alliance. The U.S. government, however, didn't want "an old style treaty of alliance with Saudi Arabia" <sup>7</sup> and instead provided other assistance including economic aid. At the same time, ARAMCO, which by 1947 had become "the world's most important oil cartel" <sup>8</sup> had worked out a contract for oil production which put the Saudi government "in essentially a colonial position." The Saudi rulers "came to depend almost entirely on the U.S. Government and ARAMCO for aid and guidance [even] on a variety of non-oil factors." <sup>9</sup> For a number of years, ARAMCO managed to make the Saudi royal family financially dependent on the company and even gave advances on oil royalties (22 cents per barrel in 1946/47) to the financially strapped Saudi king.

The U.S. government and ARAMCO continued to work hand in hand, exploiting Saudi oil (which, however, didn't prevent ARAMCO from overcharging the U.S. Navy for their oil). For example, ARAMCO provided cover for CIA officers, allowed them to pose as ARAMCO employees and even provided them with ARAMCO offices. In 1951, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a technical assistance agreement and a treaty under which the U.S. set up a military academy in Riyadh, and the Dhahran military base was leased to the U.S. for another five years. Dhahran became the largest U.S. airbase between Western Europe and Japan.

After King Abdul Aziz's death in 1953, the Saudi-U.S. friendship cooled, and a secret State Department intelligence report stated that relations between the two countries had "deteriorated seriously" in 1954, but that the "chief factor which leads the Saudi regime to maintain some degree of friendship with the U.S. is its extreme dependence on large and uninterrupted oil revenues from the ARAMCO concession." The memo added: "... the regime's dependence on the oil income and its presumable recognition of the lesson of Iran - that the world market could get

Even though the U.S.-Saudi relationship has become more important since the people of Iran deposed their dictator, Saudi Arabia will never be able to fulfill the ex-shah's role of acting as the U.S. police force in the area. The Saudi army is too small, and the royal family is "busy enough" holding on to its own power. However, the Saudi rulers have played an important role in funding reactionary governments and their militaries in the Middle East region and Africa as well as complementary rightwing organizations. Through their economic power, the Saudi rulers have much influence in Bahrain, Oman, North Yemen, and Jordan. The Saudis have even been financing anti-Communist organizations in Europe (the Italian Christian Democrats) and Asia (some of the rightwing Afghan rebels).

Before signing the Camp David Treaty, Anwar Sadat was their main recipient, and it is questionable whether he would be in power today had not the Saudis given him billions of dollars to make it through his economic crises.

In the late 1970s, Saudi Arabia distributed more aid than the U.S. to African nations (excluding Egypt). In July

1977, Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko announced that he had "received substantial aid from Saudi Arabia during the recent invasion of Shaba Province by Katangan exiles." In 1975, the Saudi rulers told the U.S. they were willing to give money to Somalia to allow that government to buy U.S. weapons and to start other aid programs to Somalia "as a means of eliminating the Russian presence there." At the time, however, that didn't fit into U.S. military objectives: the U.S. wanted to establish a naval base on Diego Garcia and needed a "Soviet threat" in Somalia to justify that project. So the deal never took place.

In 1975, it was also reported that Saudi Arabia was cooperating with the U.S. in supporting the FNLA and UNITA in Angola. Saudi officials denied, however, that they were about to give \$50 million to these groups. The Saudi rulers have also given money to Morocco and Mauritania in their war against the Polisario liberation movement, and to Sudan for arms purchases from the West. In addition, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia signed an agreement on April 7, 1980 providing for "cooperation in security matters" between the two countries.

along without Saudi Arabian oil" <sup>10</sup> would be "powerful deterrents to any attempt to nationalize or otherwise disturb the concession." <sup>11</sup>

During a 1957 trip to Washington by Abdul Aziz's successor, King Saud, relations were mended and the U.S. was granted another five year lease of the Dhahran base in exchange for continued military assistance. After a number of shuffles in the Saudi government, U.S.-Saudi relations stabilized in the mid-1960s. Under U.S. direction, then-King Faisal began to systematically rebuild the army and to structure the Saudi economy along capitalist guidelines. A close military relationship was expressed in regular visits of Saudi ports by U.S. warships and U.S. paratroopers and C-130 transport planes participating in Saudi military exercises.<sup>12</sup> After initial hesitation, the U.S. even provided military and logistical support to the Saudis in their unfruitful attempt to restore the Imam of Yemen who had been overthrown on September 26, 1962. In the same year, the U.S. base in Dhahran was formally turned over to Saudi Arabia; however, its func-

tion remained almost exactly the same.

The military market in Saudi Arabia became increasingly lucrative, especially after 1970, when Saudi annual oil revenues topped \$1 billion for the first time; and even more after the 1973 oil embargo when it reached over \$22 billion. The U.S. successfully ousted Britain from the market, and U.S. military sales shot up dramatically from \$80 million in U.S. Fiscal Year 1970 to \$5.8 billion in 1975. (Facilitating contracts were people like Kermit Roosevelt, the former CIA officer who ran the 1953 coup in Iran and who went on to consult for U.S. arms manufacturers.) From 1970 on, it was clearly the U.S. which determined the development of the Saudi military. A 1970 Pentagon "review team" headed by Major General O.A. Leahy went to Saudi Arabia to "evaluate" Saudi "defense plans and programs." The Leahy study which recommended modernization of the air force and navy was accepted by the Saudi rulers. It became "the basis for a memorandum of understanding signed in 1972 whereby the United States agreed to provide Saudi Arabia with technical and advisory assistance

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to modernize and expand its navy"<sup>13</sup> and led to a U.S.-managed modernization program for the Saudi Air Force.

Between April and June, 1974, another Pentagon survey produced a "master plan" for the development of the Saudi Air Force over the next five to ten years. The survey group also recommended a re-organization of the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation and modernization and expansion of the Saudi armed forces.

Naturally, "modernization" meant dependence on U.S. arms manufacturers. The Pentagon told the Saudi rulers not only which way to go with their military, but also what to buy. A 1977 G.A.O. report stated it bluntly: "Army and Air Force personnel are at several Saudi military cities, advising Saudi Arabian forces on maintenance and supply operations and military operational techniques. The advisory sections also give technical advice on new military equipment and the appropriations of items being considered for the Saudi armed forces... Mission and support personnel have increased since 1974 and are expected to reach 365 in October 1977... The Navy and Army advisory sections manage the implementation of two Saudi Arabian military modernization programs."<sup>15</sup> Regarding the naval expansion program, the report said that the "U.S. Navy Project Office in Washington, D.C.... is the coordination and control point for all program activities."<sup>16</sup>

U.S. military sales to Saudi Arabia in 1980 totalled \$5.8 billion and are expected to be \$5.5 billion this year.<sup>17</sup> However, some Saudi officials are increasingly asking whether their huge expenditure and U.S. planning for their military have really made their military an effective force. An article in the armed forces Journal international argued that the Saudi rulers "face the prospect of having the world's most expensive military forces in terms of dollars paid for firepower delivered without being able to deal adequately with a single major regional threat."<sup>18</sup>

In total, almost 70 percent of Saudi defense procurement expenditures since 1968 have been used to build up "military infrastructure, training base and manpower skill levels at American advice,"<sup>19</sup> and 60 percent of U.S. military sales to Saudi Arabia in 1981 consist of services for construction of military facilities in Saudi Arabia.

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It would appear then that two primary reasons for the development of the Saudi military was to put profits into the coffers of U.S. industrialists and to provide the U.S. military with facilities in the Middle East which it could use as it saw fit. As a Congressional Research Service (C.R.S.) study noted: "American military aircraft are not normally inhibited from rather routine periodic use of airfields in [Saudi Arabia] ..." The same 1979 study stated that while the U.S. has no bases "in the strictest sense" in Saudi Arabia, it does have access to Saudi facilities that "may be deemed the partial equivalent of bases - the Department of Defense would probably consider them bases if the Soviets enjoyed the same rights in lieu of the United States." 20

Via Saudi bases, in early 1979, the U.S. supplied North Yemen (which was involved in a border conflict with South Yemen) with \$300 million worth of F-5 fighter bombers, tanks, and armored personnel carriers. The weapons were paid for by the Saudi rulers.<sup>21</sup> Hundreds of U.S. military personnel participated in this operation in Saudi Arabia<sup>22</sup> and "Jeddah and Riyadh hotels were full of U.S. air force men called in to check and load... military equipment" for North Yemen.<sup>23</sup>

In addition, according to the Saudi Arabia Newsletter: "Saudi Arabia has upwards of 10,000 military and civilian personnel from the United States engaged on its bases and in its defence administration apparatus." The Newsletter also says that "much of the infrastructure, logistical manpower and the command apparatus required for an American intervention is already in place... As Washington negotiates with Oman, Somalia and Kenya for 'base facilities,' it is already in the process of quietly building up what is in effect a forward base in Saudi Arabia."<sup>24</sup>

During the last months of the Carter administration, U.S.-Saudi military ties grew even stronger, and the Saudi rulers became more open in allowing the U.S. to use their country for military purposes. On February 5, 1980 Crown Prince Fahd indicated to a visiting U.S. delegation headed by Zbigniew Brzezinski that he was "very supportive of the American plan to maintain a permanent military force" in the Middle East region. The New York Times wrote that U.S. officials "were struck by the willingness of the Saudis to talk

about cooperating in highly sensitive military actions such as ways of countering what is seen as a Soviet and Cuban threat to Yemen, as well as aid to Afghan rebels and Pakistan, and enlarging American military facilities..." In addition, the Times wrote that while "the Saudis have traditionally opposed foreign military bases on their territory," reporters were told "that the United States understands that if a military emergency in the region required the use of American forces, the Saudis would allow their facilities to be used." 25 One member of the U.S. delegation said that the Saudi rulers recognize that a stronger American military presence in the Middle East "requires the use of additional facilities." Still, to cover its flank, while the Saudi regime "is favorably disposed to U.S. facilities... it is not going to advertize the idea and may even criticize it occasionally." 26

Thus it was that "purely for defensive purposes" the Pentagon announced that they were sending four AWACS spy planes to Saudi Arabia on September 30, 1980. Counter-Spy has received two independent reports which say that there were more than four AWACS in Saudi Arabia - in fact, there were, at the height of the Iraq-Iran war, twenty AWACS. One Department of Defense employee who went to Saudi Arabia in late December 1980 saw six AWACS standing on the Dhahran airfield alone.

The planes, which were allegedly there to protect Saudi Arabia from any "spillover" from the Iraq-Iran war were "officially accompanied by 300 U.S. Air Force personnel." 27 (Since the official figure - four AWACS - is wrong, it is likely that for twenty AWACS the U.S. had to send considerably more than 300 personnel.) Ten days after the AWACS arrived, two tanker aircraft left for Saudi Arabia which enabled the AWACS, with U.S. pilots, to stay airborne almost continuously by refueling in flight. 28

Officially, the AWACS were to provide the Saudis with information about the Iraq-Iran war relevant to their own security. Independent from the strong possibility (or probability - see box) that the Saudis passed on that information to the Iraqi military which the Saudis support, the AWACS kept the U.S. informed in detail about the fighting, and it could thus be argued that Saudi Arabia was serving as a potential forward military base for the U.S.

Speculations that Saudi Arabia might have given information obtained by the AWACS planes to Iraq isn't far-fetched. In other ways, Saudi Arabia has given direct military aid to the Saddam Hussein regime. According to Der Spiegel (10/20/80), thousands of trucks shipped fuel for Iraqi MIG's from Saudi Arabia, along with food and ammunition. The MIG's also used the U.S.-constructed Tabuk air base in Saudi Arabia in-between attacks on Iran.

#### SECURITY - FOR WHOM ?

In spite of their support for an increased U.S. military presence in the Middle East, the Saudi rulers are not all that excited about the Rapid Deployment Force (R.D.F.) tactic. In discussing "security in the Persian-Arabian Gulf", the Saudi and U.S. governments have a somewhat different emphasis. For the Saudi royal family, it means primarily the continuation of their rule. (Their "sensitivity" about issues concerning the family was shown clearly when they kicked out the CIA Chief of Station in Saudi Arabia for reporting about quarrels within the family in 1979.) For the U.S., security in the region is directed at the continuation of an ample oil supply from Saudi Arabia, and U.S. dominance. The two concerns overlap, but they are not exactly the same.

The R.D.F. itself would certainly not be able to protect Saudi Arabia against foreign aggression. Moreover, "there is a ... strong impression [throughout the Gulf area] that the U.S. might use it to seize control of the Saudi oil fields. The feeling is that the R.D.F., combined with the U.S. advisory team in Saudi Arabia, is more than adequate to make a quick grab for the oil facilities in the Northeast provinces and that the U.S. might well do this in the event of another oil embargo." 29

While it might seem highly speculative to talk about a U.S. seizure of Saudi oil fields, Pentagon planners are drawing up just such contingency plans. As early as 1948, "U.S. officials decided that a secret plan should be drawn up to destroy oil refineries and plug wells in the Middle East in the event of an outbreak of war with the Soviet Union... It was decided to advise neither the oil corporations nor the host countries of this plan." 30

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Arguing that it would be impossible for the Saudi military to defend the oil fields,<sup>31</sup> the commander of the R.D.F., Lt. Gen. Paul Kelley openly advocates a "pre-emptive strategy" and favors the deployment of troops in any given area in anticipation of a military conflict. Says Kelley: "... once you get a force into an area that is not occupied by the other guy, then you have changed the whole calculus of the crisis."<sup>32</sup> Other U.S. government officials talk more openly about the possibility of the U.S. simply taking the oil fields. A 1979 Congressional Report, while cautioning against military seizures of oil fields concedes that if the government had decided to go ahead anyway, "the desert kingdom" - Saudi Arabia - would be "comparatively easy to invade."<sup>33</sup>

Statements like these, threats by U.S. officials in the wake of the 1973 oil embargo, and concern about becoming totally dependent on - in effect being controlled by - the U.S. military have motivated the Saudi rulers to look for alternative sources of arms and advisors. The Saudi military has begun to buy huge quantities of arms and equipment from Britain and France. In February 1981, West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt said that he wanted to sell tanks to Saudi Arabia, and the Saudi regime is continuously pushing for closer military collaboration with other conservative regimes in the area.

A key to building this regional alliance is the Saudi-Pakistani relationship. Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq travels frequently to Riyadh, and the Pacific News Service reported in February 1981 that the Saudi regime agreed to pay ul-Haq up to \$1 billion in cash in exchange for massive military support.<sup>34</sup> Saudi Arabia already has a "longstanding agreement" with Pakistan for military training,<sup>35</sup> and between 2,000 and 3,000 Pakistanis serve in the Saudi Army as mercenary soldiers. Under the new agreement it is not expected that a large number of additional Pakistani troops will be stationed in Saudi Arabia. Rather, ul-Haq committed some of his troops to aid the Saudi royal family if needed.

After 30 years of close U.S.-Saudi military collaboration, however, the Saudis have no quick way out of their dependence on the U.S. Buying weapons from suppliers other than the U.S. makes the tasks of

procuring spare parts and providing maintenance much more complex. And, some of the on-going U.S. military programs in Saudi Arabia will not be concluded before the end of this decade. This is true for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers program which has been described as a "massive U.S. involvement in the activities of another country - an arrangement unparalleled in time of peace."<sup>36</sup> Army Corps of Engineer programs, for example, include the designing of the King Khalid Military City, "one of the largest and most sophisticated military installations in the world."<sup>37</sup>

#### U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

As it turns out, the Army Corps of Engineers might be one of the most effective tools the U.S. has to penetrate and control Saudi economic and military planning. Its programs began in 1951 with the construction of the U.S. Air Force base in Dhahran, and a civil air terminal several years later - both paid for with U.S. funds. In August 1964, the State Department requested the Corps to "provide the necessary engineering and construction management services for designing and building certain military facilities in Saudi Arabia."<sup>38</sup>

That year the Corps began the construction of military cantonments, including housing for families, airfields and ports for the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation. The first cantonment, at Khamis Mushayt, was completed in 1971 and cost \$81.4 million; a second cantonment at Tabuk was finished in 1973 for \$81 million. And a third cantonment, King Khalid Military City will not be finished before 1990. Located near Al Batin, the Corps projected its cost in 1980 to be \$8.1 billion.<sup>39</sup> This military city will house some 70,000 people; it is complete with an airfield, missile ranges, training facilities and ammunition storage facilities, and "will give the Saudis a strong outpost on their northern frontier and could serve as a staging area should military forces have to be increased in that sensitive area."<sup>40</sup>

Other Corps of Engineers programs in Saudi Arabia include: construction of the King Abdul Aziz Military Academy near Riyadh and the Royal Saudi Air Force Headquarters in Riyadh; an "Airborne and Physical Training School" at Tabuk; deep water ports at Jubail and Jeddah as part of the

Naval Expansion Program which is managed by the U.S. Navy and will cost some \$7 billion; and assistance in construction of military airfields as part of the U.S. Air Force managed Peace Hawk and Peace Sun programs for U.S. F-5 and F-15 aircraft, respectively. The Corps has also been working on the modernization of the Saudi Army's logistics system, and since 1973, it has been responsible for designing and constructing all facilities for the modernization program of the Saudi Arabian National Guard which is directed by the U.S. Army Material Development and Readiness Command.

Indeed, Saudi Arabia is "the largest military construction program the Corps has ever had." <sup>41</sup> The Middle East Division of the Corps employs some 1,500 U.S. officials; two thirds of them are stationed in Saudi Arabia. As Gen. James Ellis, Division Engineer in the Corps, pointed out in a 1979 Congressional hearing, "Corps involvement in foreign construction programs is generally good news for American design firms and suppliers, as well as American construction contractors... In our design, we use entirely U.S. architect-engineer firms..." <sup>42</sup>

After initial approval of the projects, Saudi input into decision making about their execution is limited. Hence, the question has been raised: Who is really benefitting from these huge installations - installations that do not, and perhaps never will match the actual size of the Saudi military? U.S. and other architectural and construction corporations (Santa Fe Engineering, Bechtel, Fluor...) of course, benefit since they get a lot of business, and the infamous Saudi bribe takers, including members of the royal family, obtain millions of dollars. Still, the question remains: Does the construction even serve the continuation of the Saudi regime?

For example, King Khalid Military City would, according to its proponents, "help to guarantee the armed forces' loyalty at times of domestic political unrest by separating them from the main centres of population." <sup>43</sup> However, "in the longer term, there is the question of the city's strategic role." Conceived in the early 1970s, "the project has to some extent been overtaken by the demands of the 1980s ... The city could act as a focus for the kingdom's plan to defend the Gulf and its

eastern oilfields - however, the untested capability of the armed forces remains a more important strategic consideration." <sup>44</sup>

In short: the U.S. is providing Saudi Arabia with a huge military infrastructure and facilities for a military force of less than 50,000 men. To conclude that the Pentagon planners see this military infrastructure as being at least useful to U.S. forces in a "crisis situation" is only logical. Even some Saudi officials have begun to question the U.S. role in pushing for this huge and expensive military infrastructure. They question whether it "has given them the rate of improvement in military capability they need, and whether the U.S. has adequately considered the deterrent effect of having large numbers of modern arms" in Saudi Arabia. Some Saudi officials fear that U.S. advisors placed emphasis on constructing military installations rather than acquiring more modern weapons in order "to keep Saudi Arabia vulnerable and dependent." <sup>45</sup>

Dependence on the U.S. also reaches into the area of so-called internal security. The Saudi princes depend on U.S. intelligence and military and civilian advisors from U.S. corporations to preserve their rule which - though long perceived as "rock-solid" by many Western observers - has been severely shaken over the last few years.

#### THE OPPOSITION AND SAUDI INTELLIGENCE

On July 22, 1980 the Washington Post reported that in January of the same year, a CIA analyst had given a briefing to journalists Roberta Hornig of the Washington Star and Jane Whitmore of Newsweek. The analyst told them that the Saudi regime "might collapse within two years." (The briefing proved to be a serious embarrassment for the CIA since it was given only a few days before then-National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski was to travel to Saudi Arabia. The CIA had to do some convincing and threatening to get the Star and Newsweek not to publish the story, and former CIA Deputy Director Frank Carlucci was forced to apologize to the Saudi rulers.)

Since World War II, and especially over the last few years, the Saudi royal family has faced numerous difficulties. However, the progressive movement has not been able to present a serious challenge to the re-

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## Vinnell Corporation

The principal Saudi organization used to maintain the rule of the royal family is the National Guard. The Guard monitors the Army and suppresses political and religious opposition. Like the military, it is controlled by the U.S. In December 1972, the U.S. began the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) Modernization Program, and in March 1973, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed a "Memorandum of Understanding" which detailed that the U.S. would design and construct Guard facilities and equip and train the Guard under a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program. In January 1975, the Army Material Command, for the first time, hired a private company to conduct the training of the Guard: Vinnell Corporation of Alhambra, California. Forty-one U.S. Army personnel were assigned to the Vinnell Project "in a purely administrative capacity." Both the U.S. and Saudi governments wanted to avoid a close identification of the Saudi National Guard with the U.S. military by using a private company.

For Vinnell, it was not the first military contract. According to Time (2/24/75), the company "enjoyed a lucrative and thriving relationship with the U.S. military for the past 30 years" and constructed military facilities in Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, and South Vietnam. But their work in Vietnam was not limited to construction. As a Pentagon officer told the Village Voice (3/24/75): "When we were pulling out of Vietnam, out of the base camps and villages we held, this is the way it worked: First we'd pull out the regular ... unit assigned to the area, and replace it with a detachment of military police. Then we'd pull out the MP's, and in would go the Vinnell personnel. In civilian clothes. They were called rear security forces... The function they preformed for us was what we conveniently termed 'clean-up'.... how they 'cleaned up' was pretty much up to them... If we figured an area was certain to be overrun by the VC... they were to demolish anything and everything." Vinnell was also aiding CIA operations in Indochina. Said the Pentagon officer: "They were our own little mercenary army in Vietnam, and we used them to do things we either didn't have the manpower to do ourselves, or because of legal problems."

It is an understood prerequisite that all the people Vinnell hires for the Saudi Arabia National Guard Modernization Program are former career military as well as counterinsurgency and psychological operations experts. In essence, sending Vinnell to Saudi Arabia is "nothing less than the U.S. sending over our own mercenary army." And that is exactly what Vinnell personnel arriving in Riyadh are told. During an introductory briefing at "Camp Vinnell", Vinnell's Donald Sampson (Gen. U.S. Army, "retired") tells the employees: "You're executive mercenaries, and if you're here for any other reason than to make money, you should go home. We are not here to win the hearts and minds of the people. The royal family pays us... and very well... to do their bidding. That is why we are here. It's their show and we will do things as they dictate."

Vinnell's contract ranges from the actual training of the troops in the use of their U.S. supplied weapons to translating U.S. Army manuals for the National Guard. (Actually, the manuals are first simplified in English and then translated into Arabic. The program has a double purpose: the simplified English version is for use by U.S. military recruits - paid for by the Saudi regime.)

Presently, Vinnell has some 1,100 employees in Saudi Arabia. It is expected that Vinnell's contract which originally was only for the training of four battalions, will be extended, and within the next two or three years, 500 to 600 additional employees will be hired.

A former Defense Department employee was asked by CounterSpy whether he thought the training has been effective: "I'm not at all impressed with the National Guard... There is no commitment to support the monarchy. I get the feeling that people are just parroting what they have been told. There is loyalty only in a sense that everybody pays lip service. Even the Americans pay only lip service to the royal family. The training is imposed on the National Guard... But considering whom Vinnell is training and what their political orientation is, maybe they are doing a really fantastic job. But in terms of the same kind of training, expenditure and resources with troops that really wanted the training, there's lightyears between the two."



gime due to its lack of organization and the extremely difficult objective conditions in Saudi Arabia. Another major reason is the severe repression carried out by the Saudi rulers but often masterminded by foreigners.

The first sophisticated foreign intelligence agency working for the royal family was maintained by ARAMCO beginning in the 1940s.<sup>46</sup> (In 1944, former Coordinator of Information (COI, a predecessor to the CIA) officer Colonel William Eddy who had a wide experience of intelligence operations in the Middle East also became U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia.<sup>47</sup>) ARAMCO and its intelligence organization had to deal with a number of strikes beginning in 1953. The Saudi rulers became increasingly concerned and retaliated by arresting whomever they wanted without any legal process.<sup>48</sup>

A secret State Department memorandum of 1950 also said that Saudi King Abdul Aziz asked then-Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee for U.S. military aid "to assure internal security."<sup>49</sup> Six years later, following U.S. security assistance, a secret report prepared by the State Department's Office of Intelligence Research admitted that "the authoritarian and despotic features inherent in the Saudi traditions have tended ... to increase dissidence on all levels of Saudi Arabian society... Dissatisfaction is focused largely on the conspicuous consumption of public funds by the royal family..." The memo argued that while different political opposition groups did not have "sufficient common ground on which to organize a united opposition" the loyalty of the army was a "doubtful factor which endangers the stability of the regime."<sup>50</sup> At the time, the Saudi rulers were also being advised by Nazi Werner Otto von Hentig, a "West German national who was a key diplomatic figure in the Axis espionage and sabotage effort in the Near East during World War II."<sup>51</sup>

Despite its suppression, numerous opposition groups grew out of the 1953 ARAMCO strike, and ARAMCO was forced to give in to some of their demands. In 1956, however, King Saud decreed that participation in any strike was forbidden under penalty of imprisonment. The impetus for this decree was a confrontation with thousands of workers chanting "Down with American Imperialism" and "We want elected Trade

Unions" while Saud was eating a stuffed lamb dinner prepared for him by ARAMCO.<sup>52</sup>

The nationalist movement in Saudi Arabia was stimulated by Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalist policies in Egypt such as nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in 1956. At the same time, the Saudi ruling family was going through serious internal conflicts which gave the fragmented opposition groups greater opportunity. In response, the Saudi rulers established the March 1961 State Security Law which prescribed the death sentence or at least twenty-five years in prison for anyone convicted of an "aggressive act" against the royal family. In 1962, besides strengthening the National Guard, the Saudi rulers also "brought in U.S. intelligence experts to cope with the growing tide of left-wing activity."<sup>53</sup> In December 1966 bombs planted in several government and military buildings as well as at the office of the senior U.S. advisor in Riyadh resulted in the sacking of fifteen army officers and the forced retirement of the Riyadh Director of Police.<sup>54</sup>

Over the next years, arrests and executions of Saudi citizens and deportations of tens of thousands of foreign workers took place. Helen Lackner writes in A House Built on Sand that U.S. and British personnel participated in the interrogation and torture of Saudi Arabians arrested in Riyadh. Increasingly, protests were directed against the U.S. During the June 1967 war, the U.S. Consulate in Dhahran was attacked; American clubs, military barracks, cars, and recreation centers were demolished, and the local ARAMCO headquarters in Dhahran was burned.

The Saudi rulers have been fairly successful in blacking out news about internal opposition. This is especially true for reports about conflicts within the royal family, and attempted coups from the

The following Saudi police and intelligence officers were trained in the FBI National Academy: Yakya Abdallah al Muallimi (8/69); Hashim Abd Almwla (8/69); Dlayyim al Asiri (8/69); Muhammad Din Hallal (7-8/70); Mustafa Izzat Hilmi (7-8/70); Mustafa Ahmad Irgsus (8/69); Abd al Ghani Hasan Jawah (7-8/70); Said Kurdi (8/69); Khalil Muhammad Niyazi (7-8/70); Naji Nuraldeon (7-8/70); Ali Hassan Sayrafi (8/69); Hamad Abdallah al Urayfi (7-8/70).

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military. Presumably as a reflection of increased internal problems, Saudi officials decided on July 7, 1979 to increase their "financial allocations for news management and disinformation campaigns in Western Europe from \$50 million to \$100 million... [and] in the United States and Canada... from \$70 million to \$140 million." Much of this media campaign is carried out through the Arab Media Council, which was at one point headed by the former chief of Saudi intelligence, Sheikh Kamal Ibrahim Adham.<sup>55</sup> In a recent issue, the conservative International Currency Review lists a number of attempted coups and defections by Saudi officers as well as serious internal factionalism within the royal family which received negligible coverage in the Western media.

The Review argues that the events in Mecca in November, 1979 have to be seen against a background of continued infighting in the royal family and political and religious opposition to their rule, and not simply as an outbreak of religious fanaticism. On November 20 several hundred men, denouncing the Saudi regime for its corruptness took over the Grand Mosque in Mecca. The Saudi military and National Guard were not able to put down the insurrection by themselves.

Therefore, according to the French Le Point, King Khalid asked French President Giscard D'Estaing to send a five member French anti-terror squad which flew to Saudi Arabia on November 23 and directed the final attack on the insurgents on December 3. Le Point says that one reason for the French aid was the friendship between Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef and the head of the French intelligence service (SDECE), Count Alexandre de Marenches. Several French security advisors are now serving in the Saudi Interior Ministry, and Saudi Arabia and France have a joint security committee. On the French side, it includes Jean Pierre Richer of the Interior Ministry and Jacques Solier, director general of the French national police; and on the Saudi side General Abdallah al ash-Shaykh, the director general of security and Major Gen. Muhammad al-Balla, the commander of the Special Security Forces.<sup>57</sup>

In addition to the French intervention, the Washington Post reported that "knowledgeable sources" in Saudi Arabia said

that the "Saudis ... sought advice from the large U.S. military training mission and the Corps of Engineers team," and "Saudi princes were in frequent telephone contact with U.S. officials during the siege." <sup>58</sup>

A reliable report received by CounterSpy says that Vinnell Corporation, a CIA-linked private security firm training the Saudi National Guard, played a major role in defeating the Mecca insurgents. First, the Saudi commanders sent in some National Guard troops that hadn't gone through the Vinnell training program. Casualties among these troops were reportedly very high, and they were not able to advance in spite their use of heavy weapons including TOW missiles. Vinnell Corporation and the U.S. Military Assistance Command personnel were eventually called in to support and advise the modernized elements of the National Guard that had been brought in from distant posts for this mission. Together these two resources provided the beleaguered and inexperienced (though "modernized") National Guard units with the tactical support needed to recapture the Mosque.

The take-over and simultaneous anti-government demonstrations and "uprisings" <sup>59</sup> in the oil producing provinces shook the regime deeply. They led to the dismissal and replacement of high ranking government officials and a severe police crackdown. To placate fundamentalist Muslim opponents who criticize the corruptness of the Saudi rulers, Muslim laws and regulations began to be enforced more strictly. The Saudi government also proclaimed a campaign against corruption. Other measures included "an attempt to tighten internal security and intelligence gathering." <sup>60</sup>

In June 1980, Interior Minister Nayef began signing contracts for Saudi Arabia's \$159 million internal security program. "Apparently the new program - as a result of the Mecca/Medina conflict ... - will be administered by the Interior Minister and Intelligence Chief Prince Turki and includes a special anti-terrorist force... This program includes helicopters, a wide variety of police equipment (such as SWAT vans...) and U.S. electronic security systems." <sup>61</sup> In addition, Saudi officials asked the West German government to send some elite GSG-9 "anti-terror" commandos

to Saudi Arabia to train local troops.<sup>62</sup> Assistance for the Saudi intelligence also comes from Raymond Close, former CIA Chief of Station in Saudi Arabia who went on to become chief advisor to the Saudi intelligence in 1977. Close previously served in Lebanon, Egypt (Alexandria and Cairo) and in Pakistan (Lahore and Rawalpindi).

This year, Saudi intelligence will also begin using a sophisticated computer system supplied by the British multinational company, Scientific Control Systems (Sci-con), a subsidiary of British Petroleum. According to an investigation by the West German Stern magazine and the British New Statesman, Saudi intelligence and Scicon signed a contract for the system in November 1975 in what was "believed to be the largest single contract ever awarded to any European computer company."<sup>63</sup> Computer centers are in Riyadh and Jeddah, with over twenty branch terminals, and with a liaison to British intelligence and the CIA. Saudi intelligence can now maintain files on one million persons, and in 1975 alone, the number of persons "on file" had grown by about 50 percent to almost 200,000. The sale of the computers meant, of course, that British and U.S. intelligence had yet another way to penetrate Saudi society and to contribute to the repression. As the New Statesman pointed out: "The export of any cryptographic equipment unless specifically approved by the government is prohibited by British law. In this case all licenses are checked by Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ), the monitoring agency based in Cheltenham... And for anyone to believe that GCHQ would allow the export of cipher equipment that neither they - nor their U.S. equivalent, the NSA - could break would stretch well beyond naivete."<sup>64</sup>

Completing the repression of any Saudi dissent, the CIA is "concerned" with Saudi dissidents in the U.S. The Washington Post reported on July 22, 1980 that "a shadowy international group... is stepping up a propaganda campaign among the 13,000 Saudi students in the United States," and that the CIA has notified the FBI of its "interest" in the group. A spokesperson for the organization, called "Sout al-Taliah" - (Voice of the Vanguard; it appears to be a progressive nationalist organization which calls for a democratic parlia-

mentary system in Saudi Arabia) commented: "We feel some pressure. We think it should stop. If not, the American establishment will become involved with the Saudi intelligence as they did with SAVAK... of the shah."

#### FOOTNOTES

- 1) Activities of the United States Army Corps of Engineers in Saudi Arabia, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st session, 6/25/79, p.1.
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- 4) Proposed Aircraft Sales to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, Hearings before the Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 2nd session, 5/8-10, 16/78, p.155.
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- 14) *ibid.*, p.9.
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- 23) MEED Special Report, Saudi Arabia, June 1979, p.3.
- 24) Saudi Arabia Newsletter, 6/30-7/13/80, pp.4,5.
- 25) New York Times (NYT), 2/6/80, p.A-11.
- 26) Washington Post (WP), 2/6/80, p.A-7.
- 27) WP, 10/1/80, p.A-14.
- 28) WP, 10/12/80, p.A-8.
- 29) cf supra, #18, p.51.
- 30) cf supra, #8, p.vi.
- 31) see Wall Street Journal, 1/21/80.
- 32) MERIP Reports, Sept.80, p.5.
- 33) Oil Imports: A Range of Policy Options, A Study prepared at the Request of the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the Committee on Interstate Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st session, by the Congressional Research Service, Nov.

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36) U.S. News and World Report, 10/18/76, p.77.

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60) cf supra, #58.

61) Strategy Week, 6/2-8/80, p.3.

62) Philadelphia Inquirer, 2/6/80, p.8C.

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64) ibid., p.386.

## Turkey: Torture for NATO by Konrad Ege

Following the September 12, 1980 military coup in Turkey most of the Western media willingly echoed Turkish military government statements that the overthrow of the elected government of Suleyman Demirel was necessary to restore democracy. Under the headline, "Junta Leader Outlines Reforms to Save Turkish Democracy", the Washington Post, for one, accepted General Kenan Evren's pronouncements that his military takeover was "not a coup d'etat as described in the history books" but an "operation carried out to remove the threat to our democracy."<sup>1</sup>

For years, the Western, corporate-controlled media has perpetuated a myth of a Turkish democracy that was threatened by terrorism from the left and from the right. While it is true that terrorism existed - and exists - in Turkey (in 1979 and 1980 some 5,000 people were killed), most of it was carried out by extreme rightwing organizations, especially the Grey Wolves and was sanctioned by rightwing governments and politicians.

The roots of the virtual civil war during 1979 and 1980 (up to 20 people were killed per day as of mid-1980) were often ignored in Western reporting: unemployment of more than 25 percent; an International Monetary Fund-imposed austerity program; an inflation rate of over 100 percent; and an oversized, repressive army with an "inflated and unaffordable force structure."<sup>2</sup>

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Rightwing terrorist groups like the Grey Wolves were encouraged and aided by large sectors of the military, police and intelligence apparatus. The close collaboration between the government and the fascist Grey Wolves was particularly visible during the last year of the Demirel government in 1980. The Grey Wolves carried out vicious assassination and terror campaigns against suspected leftists with hardly any governmental interference.

Indeed, the Turkish army and police themselves were responsible for terrorizing a large part of the population. At the time of the coup, one third of Turkey's 67 provinces, including Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, and Adana as well as the Kurdish region in the east were under martial law; and even before the coup, laws were extremely repressive and directed against progressive and Kurdish nationalist organizations. For instance, articles 141 and 142 of the Penal Code provided 8 to 15 year prison sentences for membership in "organizations which advocate the domination of one class in society over another" and the death penalty for "administering" such an organization. These two articles were frequently applied to Kurdish nationalists and individuals who simply talked about the Kurdish people in public. (About 15 percent of the population in Turkey is Kurdish.) Under articles 141 and 142, the activities of progressive parties and

unions were severely curtailed and the Turkish Communist Party made illegal. An Amnesty International delegation found in May 1980 that torture was "widespread and systematic" under the Demirel government.

After the September coup, the military was careful to present a picture of cracking down on all terrorism. In fact, the leader of the extreme rightist Nationalist Action Party, Alparslan Türkeş was detained and some of his Grey Wolves were arrested. However, as the West German weekly Der Spiegel had to admit, the military is now moving primarily against progressive labor unions,<sup>3</sup> which have gained increasing strength. The popular leftist labor federation DISK was banned, while Türk-İs, a conservative union set up with the help of the AFL-CIO and trained in CIA-connected courses in the U.S., was not curtailed. Türk-İs' secretary general, Sadek Side, was made Minister of Social Security in the new regime<sup>4</sup> while over 2,000 members of DISK were arrested and many of them were tortured.

In spite of his blindness in the right eye, Evren succeeded in convincing the Western media that the army was acting as an impartial arbitrator. For people in Turkey, reality is different. Evren's rule is marked by a campaign of repression. According to the Financial Times, 10,000 people were arrested in the first week after the coup,<sup>5</sup> and even the figures supplied by the military show that a large number of the ten-thousands arrested in the following months are progressives and Kurdish nationalists. On December 25, 1980 the Martial Law Committee announced that from September 10 to December 10, 29,995 people had been arrested.<sup>6</sup> By now, the estimated number of those detained is greater than 50,000 - a figure that does not even include arrests in Turkish Kurdistan because communication from that area is drastically curtailed.<sup>7</sup>

Systematic torture continues in Turkish prisons. According to Ali Yurtaslan, a member of the Grey Wolves who defected, at least one department in each prison is under the control of the extreme right.<sup>8</sup> "Detainees can expect to be tortured during a period of detention which can now last up to 90 days."<sup>9</sup> Torture includes beatings, electric shocks, tearing out of finger and toenails, burning, beatings of the soles of the feet and forced walking on salt or glass, and many other painful

and humiliating methods. Prisoners are shot when they "try to escape", and some have mysteriously "committed suicide." Three people, for example, have "accidentally" fallen out of the same fifth floor window at the Security Headquarters in Bursa. Another prisoner was said to "have died of a brain hemorrhage after 'banging his head against his cell wall in a fit of nervous depression'." <sup>10</sup>

Other cases, detailed in Turkey Today (London), include İlhan Erdost, a prominent left-wing publisher. He was beaten to death in the Mamak military prison in Ankara. Former Grey Wolf, Ali Yurtaslan, said about Mamak: "Our [Grey Wolf] lawyers had to visit the prisons at least once a week to smuggle in weapons and money [to the Grey Wolf prisoners]... They also took ... the names of progressives who were in prison to have them killed. However, there was no need to smuggle weapons into... Mamak, because the officers... and soldiers there were already giving enough."<sup>11</sup>

#### U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE 1980 COUP

The September 12, 1980 coup was the third time in recent history that the Turkish military ousted an elected government; the first time was in 1960, and then again in 1971 - both times with U.S. approval. According to former Turkish foreign minister Sabri Caglayangil, the 1971 coup was "basically initiated and supported by the CIA." He stated: "The Americans aren't concerned whether Turkey has a democratic... or fascist government. They are only concerned about Turkey's strong ties to the U.S. and it being a U.S. satellite."<sup>12</sup> In addition, Emin Deger, formerly a high-ranking advisor to the Turkish Defense Department, charged in his book CIA, Counter-Guerilla and Turkey that the CIA, acting through the Turkish intelligence agency MIT and a special military unit, the Counter-Guerilla, was promoting rightwing terrorist actions to destabilize the government and make way for military rule in 1971.<sup>13</sup>

The U.S. role in the 1980 coup is less clear. However, the State Department's denial of "any foreknowledge"<sup>14</sup> appears strained particularly since Turkish Air Force commander General Tahsin Sahinkaya, now a junta member, had been in Washington just prior to the coup.

Whether or not there was any direct U.S.

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support for the coup, Carter administration officials were quick to put their stamp of approval on Evren's government. NATO maneuvers in Turkey went ahead as scheduled with only Belgium abstaining "in view of recent developments in Turkey." NATO commander U.S. General Bernard Rogers visited Turkey less than one month after the coup and held talks with Evren, and Turkish Deputy Premier Turgut Özal, who had been chief economic advisor to Demirel, went to Washington to meet with Zbigniew Brzezinski and International Monetary Fund and World Bank officials. International lending institutions and private banks also showed their support for Evren when he made clear that he would continue Özal's IMF-imposed economic program of austerity for the people and no restraints on foreign investments.

Clearly, the September coup has served the interests of multinational corporations and banks in the U.S. and Western Europe as well as, from a military point of view, the NATO alliance. Once again, NATO, which is supposed to defend democracy, has a member which is ruled by a military dictatorship. Not surprisingly, "the news of the military coup in Turkey was received with relief in NATO circles in

Brussels."<sup>16</sup> But even the London Economist which praised Evren's coup, had to concede that it "may be regrettable" since "the western alliance draws strength from its commitment to democratic institutions and is morally weakened when the democratically elected government of a member country is forcibly overthrown."<sup>17</sup>

For the 50,000 arrested, for the torture victims, it is more than "regrettable" as once again, in Turkey they are torturing for democracy and the U.S. and NATO are standing by and applauding.

#### FOOTNOTES

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- 12) Frankfurter Rundschau, 3/31/78.
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- 17) The Economist, 9/20/80, p.15.

## CIA-Lebanon

"If the CIA can convince Reagan to adopt its solution for the Arab-Israeli conflict, then Lebanon is in for a rough time," according to The Middle East (Feb. 1981). The magazine's editor Raphael Calis, basing his allegations on leaked CIA documents, wrote that CIA plans are already drawn up for the promotion of the "Jordan option," (creation of a West Bank entity under Jordanian-Israeli rule, excluding the PLO) which includes "weakening of the Palestinians in the Middle East. And since Lebanon is the only bastion where the Palestinians are concentrated, ... the showdown is bound to be on Lebanese soil."

Under the CIA supported plan, the Phalangists would move into West Beirut and drive the Palestinians south. The CIA "has confidence" in the rightwing Lebanese Front based on their performance in the civil war of 1975-76, when they massacred

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thousands of Palestinians in Tel al-Zaatar. (The CIA, through its station in Greece headed by Richard Welch, was one of the main suppliers of the Lebanese Front.) Simultaneously with this attack, the Israelis, fighting alongside rightwing Lebanese leader Saad Haddad, would attack the Syrian troops in southern Lebanon. Given the splits between Arab countries, it is not at all assured that Iraq and Jordan would assist Syria. In that case, the defeat for Syria and the PLO could be serious.

However, Raphael Calis wrote, people in Lebanon are tired of fighting, and are not in the least interested in making Lebanon "the stage for another confrontation," and some of the internal parties involved in the Lebanese conflict are negotiating to prevent Lebanon from being torn up in a conflict benefitting mainly Israel and the U.S.

## MOSSAD Terrorism

The Israeli government is extremely nervous about the arrest of a MOSSAD operative on January 2, 1981 in Limosol, Cyprus. The operative, carrying a Canadian passport with the name Michael Anthony Bevin, was arrested in connection with the bombing of a car belonging to a politically active Palestinian, Hani al-Hindi. Incredibly, Hindi was not killed when 20 pounds of TNT exploded under his car. "Bevin" confessed during questioning by Cypriot police that he had placed the explosives, and that he had been involved in other assassinations and assassination attempts in Europe.

Hindi's assassination had been planned since late 1977. He had been a minister in the Syrian government in 1963, and has worked in Arab nationalist movements for 30 years. Until 1970, Hindi was a political and military planner in the Palestinian movement. Since then he has remained in the background while working with the Institute of Arab Research in Beirut.

A colleague of Hindi's, Nubar Hovsepien stated in a recent interview with WFW radio in Washington, D.C. that he believes this attack on Hindi may signal the beginning of an all-out war by Israel on Pales-

tinian and other Arab leaders who are critical of Israel's expansionist policies. Hovsepien also linked the assassination attempt to stepped-up Israeli attacks on Lebanon and aid to rightwing Lebanese forces, and said that MOSSAD's terrorism is intended to provoke retaliatory actions by Palestinian groups, which, in turn, can be used to justify increased repression and attacks on Palestinian camps in Lebanon.

The arrest of a MOSSAD operative in Cyprus - who after all, confessed committing the crimes - is proving to be a problem for the Israeli government. It has hired three top lawyers to defend him, and has even offered to withdraw its recognition of the Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus - which would constitute a major diplomatic victory for Cyprus - in exchange for freeing "Bevin." So far the Cypriot Attorney General has decided to proceed with the case.

The assassination attempt and the subsequent arrest of "Bevin" has received wide publicity in the Third World, Eastern and Western Europe, and even Canada. The U.S. media, and the "terrorism as top priority" Reagan administration have ignored it.

## ASIO Names

Similar to bills pending in the U.S. Congress, Australia has a strict Official Secrets Act which forbids the naming of intelligence officers. However, there might be a way to get around the law as exemplified by Joan Coxsedg, a courageous Labor Party member of the Victoria State Parliament.

There is a tradition that Labor representatives read Christmas poems during the last session of Parliament before holidays. Last December, Joan Coxsedg read one of her poems, and it was duly reprinted in the official Parliamentary record. What her colleagues had missed is that the poem contained the names of no fewer than three ASIO (Australian Security Intelligence Organization) officers.

*Christmas time once more is here;  
Father Christmas, too, is back.*

*To the rich he gives good cheer;  
To the poor he gives the sack.*

*Mellow messages abound,  
Peace on earth, to all, good will,  
The Christmas spirit is around,  
Either brewed or from the still.*

*Now is the time to send my love  
To all my friends, no matter where,  
Who watch below or watch above,  
I watch them watch me here and there.*

*Each trench-coat hides a soul so fair,  
How come that I should quibble  
With men like Charlie Francis Bare,  
Joe Quigley or the brothers Gribble?*

*I thank them and I thank you all;  
I hope that '81 will bring  
Each member of this noble hall  
- Except the Liberals - everything.*

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ASIO is Australia's secret political police and, according to the Committee for the Abolition of Political Police (CAPP, 8 Leicester Street, North Balwyn 3104, Australia), targets "anyone to the left of Adolf Hitler." ASIO works closely with U.S. intelligence agencies, and its records are "an open book to the FBI and the CIA."

A few days after Coxsedg read her poem, someone broke into her office. Coxsedg said that the break-in was carried out by ASIO as a "direct result" of her revelations. She stated that it was intended as a warning: "Nothing was taken in the raid but they definitely went through my office, leaving the lights on when they left."

Joan Coxsedg has a long record of exposing Australian intelligence agencies. She is one of the leaders of CAPP; and in a recent press release she reported that the departure of the CIA Chief of Station in Australia, Michael C. Sednaoui, was imminent. (Sednaoui served in Morocco for most of his career, and in Italy as Deputy Chief of Station.) Coxsedg links his leaving to on-going revelations about CIA involvement in the Nugan Hand affair (see CounterSpy, Nov.80-Jan.81) and stated that "it would be extremely embarrassing for top CIA personnel, such as Michael Sednaoui, to be present in Australia when the full Nugan Hand story finally blows."

A few weeks before the "ASIO Act" - which makes the publication of the names of ASIO officers a crime - was proclaimed last year, CAPP released the following list of ASIO staff. CAPP outlined why the Australian government saw a need to restrict freedom of the press. (CAPP's explanation is equally applicable to present moves in the U.S. Congress to outlaw the naming of CIA and FBI officers and agents.): "All around the world, capitalist economies are failing. Those in power cannot provide solutions, but are preparing for the unrest that could arise as more ordinary working people feel the effects of technology, inflation, unemployment, corruption, union bashing, pollution and bureaucratic pressures." CAPP also addressed arguments that political police are necessary to curb political terrorism: "Political violence is already being inflicted on Australians. At the expense of working people, the rich are getting rich-

er. There are savage and increasing cut-backs in public spending such as education, social welfare, public transport, etc. ... In support of this official violence, radical elements are being weeded out in industry, the Public Service and in political organizations."

"Every exposure of secret agencies is a positive contribution towards political freedom. Remember, the names appearing [below] are not members of a benevolent society but are enemies of social progress."

Linden Charles ADAMSON  
7 Metung Court, Dingley

Barry Thomas Albert BANKS  
77 Rollinghills Road, Chirnside Park,  
Lilydale

Tudor Harvey BARNETT  
17 Mount Ida Avenue, East Hawthorn

Gary Michael BEHM  
32 Royal Street, Chatswood

John Charles BEHM (retired)  
22 Werder Street, Box Hill

Ian Stuart Charles BRYCE  
364 Auburn Road, Hawthorn

Bruce CAMPBELL  
21 Plantation Avenue, East Brighton

George CLEGG  
Flat 12, 49 Kensington Road, South Yarra

Allan Leslie COLLYER  
42 South Road, Brighton Beach

John William DONLEVY  
18/240 Domain Road, South Yarra

John Cecil ELLIOT

Beryl Vera FOOKES  
28 Pine Street, East Brighton

Donald FRASER

David Christopher FRY  
4 Corona Street, Ivanhoe

John Francis GARVEY  
6 Ontario Street, North Caulfield

Roy E. HEATH  
5 Spencer Place, Chatswood

Peter John HEGARTY  
15 Jennings Street, Sandringham

Stephen Charles HOCKING  
19 Gladswood Gardens, Double Bay

Gordon Henry JIEAR  
25 Chalmers Street, McKinnon

James Robert LANDMAN  
8 Rankin Street, Campbell, ACT

Kenneth Norman W. LAWRY  
38 Fraser Street, Glen Waverly

John Raymond MACE  
5 Head Street, Balwyn

Howard MILLER  
1A Glana Court, Ringwood North

William Major MONKHOUSE  
52 Cole Street, Elwood

Darwin Kennedy MULES  
14 Barnard Grove, North Kew

Francis Xavier MURPHY  
9 Chaddesley Avenue, East St. Kilda

Blair NEINABER  
28 Alexandria Avenue, Canterbury

Thomas Charles NICHOLS  
44 Winifred Street, Oak Park

Robert John ORR  
80 Blackwood Avenue, Mentone

Thomas Hardy PALETHORPE  
6 Sandgate Road, Blackburn South

Geoffrey Churchill PALMER  
682 Inkerman Road, North Caulfield

Lindsay Michael PATTERSON  
8 Elmwood Crescent, Glen Waverly

Douglas Seaton PRATT  
Flat 1, 32 Iris Road, Glen Iris

John Barrie ROSS-PERRIER  
40 Hanby Street, Brighton

Murray Cooper RUSSELL  
41 Lusk Drive, Vermont

Leslie James RYAN  
612 Mowbray Road, Lane Cove

Leslie Canberra SCOTT  
8 Morotai Crescent, Castlecrag

Howard Milson SMALL  
10 Inga Street, Burwood

Colin Douglas SMITH  
51 Peacock Street, Seaforth

Reginald Sydney SPEAR  
3 Wallis Avenue, Glen Iris

James Thomas STEVENS  
87 Harold Street, Albert Park

Leslie Allen THOMAS  
3 Brae Grove, Nunawading

Morris Fraser TUCK  
21 Balmoral Crescent, Surrey Hills

R. J. WARBY  
38 Austin Avenue, North Curl Curl

## ASIO: Made in USA

The following is a letter from Brigadier Sir Charles Spry (Director General of ASIO from 1950 to 1970) to former CIA Director Allen Dulles. It was written on ASIO stationery (G.P.O. Box No.5105BB, Melbourne). The Jim Angleton referred to in the letter is James Jesus Angleton, the CIA's Chief of Counterintelligence from 1954 to 1974. Angleton, who was considered rightwing even within the CIA, was forced to retire in December 1974 in the wake of revelations of illegal CIA operations.

16 January, 1969.

Dear Allen,

I was so sorry to hear that you were in hospital. I do sincerely trust that you are making a speedy recovery. I was very disappointed that I missed seeing you on my last trip to the States. I do not feel that any of my visits to the U.S.A. are complete without such an honour.

I shall never cease to be grateful to you for the initiation and development of relations between your Service and mine. I consider, without reservations, that this was the turning point which has enabled A.S.I.O. to reach the level of sophistication which it now enjoys. Jim Angleton and others have continued to assist us. I always consider you as the No.1 Honorary Australian in our Organization, and Jim No.2.

We have now moved into our new building (and I hope our final resting place). The Government has been more than generous and we have most opulent surroundings. I do earnestly (sic) hope that you may come to see us. There could not be a more welcome guest.

May both Kathleen and I wish you all the most healthful good wishes for the New Year.

With warmest regards,

Yours very sincerely

/signed/  
(C.C.F. SPRY)

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## RCMP Updates

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) was created under its present name in 1920, but its origins date back to 1873 when it was called the North West Mounted Police (NWMP). One of the main tasks of the NWMP - which began as a military organization - was to "relocate" Native people in reservations and to open up Canada's Northwest for the colonists. Up to the present, the RCMP has preserved a quasi-military structure. Officially, it has two main functions: 1) it enforces federal laws in all of Canada, and, in addition, performs all criminal police functions in eight of Canada's ten provinces as well as the North West Territories and the Yukon; 2) it serves as a counter-espionage force.

Like the FBI and the CIA in the U.S., the RCMP often has interpreted its mandate to extend well beyond the law. Former RCMP Superintendent Donald Cobb, for one, spelled it out when he told the Toronto Star that even though he doesn't like a

"police state in which police forces are powers unto themselves," an RCMP officer has to be prepared "to chose between the law and neglecting his duty." Cobb continued: "We are taught a basic methology when we join the service, and we never as- sociate certain functions with illegali- ty."

Another RCMP officer told an official investigatory commission that: "Mounties have been trained to believe that the RCMP Act overrides all other Canadian legisla- tion." Ex-RCMP Corporal Jack Ramsey de- scribed it even more bluntly when he wrote that an RCMP member "must place the force ahead of truth, justice, and service to the people of Canada..." Commented Edward Mann and John Lee in RCMP Vs. The People: "Thus an officer's order under the RCMP Act would authorize the violation of any Canadian law."

It is no surprise that with such a men- tality the RCMP has engaged in numerous illegal activities: Mail openings, break- ins, thefts, buggings, wire tappings, ar- son, forgeries, bombings, and beatings. The RCMP systematically surveils and of- ten disrupts labor unions; Quebec nation- alist, Native American, and Black activist organizations; the National Farmers' Union; progressive political parties; and community organizations.

In summer 1977, two commissions were created to investigate RCMP activities; one, headed by Jean Francois Keable, on the provincial level in Quebec; and the other, on a national level, headed by Jus- tice David McDonald. According to the To- ronto Star, "a significant body of opinion ... believes that the commission was a ploy of Ottawa to cover up or shelve em- barrassing cases of police abuse and po- litical responsibility." Jean Paul Brodeur, himself a member of the Keable Commission, wrote that "it may not be un- fair to say the McDonald Commission was initially created by the federal govern- ment to justify its reluctance to cooper- ate with the Keable Commission" which was announced one month before the McDonald Commission.

In spite of these and other shortcomings both Commissions revealed a good deal ab- out RCMP illegalities, and, most impor- tantly, for the first time raised serious questions about the true nature of the RCMP. Unfortunately, most of the Canadian media didn't pick up where the official

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investigation left off and preferred to focus on individual wrongdoing by RCMP officers. Likewise, most politicians preferred to get rid of a few highly visible culprits but left the structure of the RCMP untouched.

One area that needs more examination is the RCMP's close collaboration with the CIA and the FBI, and its maintenance of extensive files on Canadians. The RCMP has computerized fingerprints of over 1.5 million persons, and an unspecified number of files on individuals are kept at the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC), located in the RCMP headquarters. CPIC is part of an integrated international computerized system based in Washington, D.C. Unlimited access to these files is given to Interpol, the international police organization headquartered in Paris, and the FBI and CIA. FBI and RCMP "routinely exchange information placed in electronic files on people, vehicles, and other things."

These facts clearly support the conclusion of Mann and Lee in RCMP Vs. The People that "no other organization in Canada is so well placed, so well equipped, with so little countervailing control" as the RCMP; its "quasimilitary structure would prove eminently adaptable for a police state's functioning."

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## **Pratt & Whitney**

Months after three workers - Suzanne Chabot, Wendy Stevenson, and Katy LeRougetel - were fired from their jobs at Pratt & Whitney Aircraft in Longueuil, Quebec, in November 1979, the Quebec Human Rights Commission revealed that the firings took place after the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) had informed Pratt & Whitney management that the three were leftists. An RCMP officer of the Security Service (SS) Division, Fernand Brault, had contacted Jacques St. Pierre, head of internal security at Pratt & Whitney (a former

RCMP SS officer himself) and told him that the three were socialists.

Pratt & Whitney, a United Technology subsidiary, first justified the firings on the basis of a "surplus of workers", but wasn't able to get away with that version; so it accused LeRougetel, Chabot and Stevenson with trying to create "disturbances." However, J.C. Roy, head of "Industrial Relations" hasn't been able to substantiate these claims either. The three were productive workers (LeRougetel was even offered a promotion), and they are unionists, feminists, and socialists.

Since the politically motivated firings, the RCMP has tried to cover up and legitimate its involvement in the case. Canada's Solicitor General, Robert Kaplan, took four months to answer a letter by Svend Robinson, a New Democratic Party member of Parliament, regarding RCMP involvement in the firings. Kaplan's reply is illustrative of the way Canada's government is handling their version of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act. Under the so-called Human Rights Act, the federal government is required to "allow individual Canadians to review information held about them in federal information banks." However, there is one exception - citizens don't have the right to look at files that involve "the matter of national security," which, of course, includes information from spying on progressive organizations and unions.

First Kaplan informed Robinson (rather hypocritically) that he was not allowed to give him information about RCMP surveillance of the three women because: "I and the RCMP are bound by the Human Rights Act to protect the privacy of individuals..." Kaplan argued that information like that can only be given to the individuals themselves. But: "It is my understanding that a direct request for personal information by Misses LeRougetel, Chabot and Stevenson for security related information would in all likelihood be denied on the basis of national security." Kaplan, of course, did not explain how union activism and other legal political activities were connected to Canada's national security. He concluded his letter by assuring Robinson that "to the best of my knowledge, activities of the RCMP Security Service are maintained within the mandate as authorized by Cabinet in 1975." (Letter as quoted in Socialist Voice)

Former Solicitor General Warren Allmand  
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disagrees: "...the mandate is fairly clear... the Security Service is not supposed to survey individuals merely because they belong to a socialist party or an agrarian party or some other kind of party."

These firings have provoked a considerable public reaction. The Quebec Human Rights Commission ruled them politically-motivated, and local 510 of the United Auto Workers (UAW) filed a grievance which resulted in arbitration hearings. The Committee to Defend the Pratt 3 is giving support to the three workers and educating the public about the far-reaching implications of the case. The Committee can be contacted at 4271 Chambord, Montreal, Quebec.

## The Worthington-Bennett Case

"The United States manipulates every other area of our lives, we shouldn't have too much trouble accomodating ourselves to the fact that the CIA manipulated our intelligence services all these years... So what? It's all part of being a colony." These words conclude a remarkable novel: "S: Portrait of a Spy; RCMP Intelligence - The Inside Story," written by Ian Adams and published in November 1977.

Adams tells the story of "S," the former director of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Security Service (RCMP SS). "S" turns out to be a KGB agent who is discovered by the CIA and turned around to work for the U.S. The RCMP is not informed about his being a double agent, and it takes them several years to discover that fact. The RCMP eventually expells "S" but choses not to go public with the story or to put him on trial.

"S: Portrait of a Spy" - though a novel - is also an unprecedented exposé of the RCMP's massive surveillance and suppression of trade unions and political organizations, as well as other RCMP illegal activities stemming from its reactionary ideology. Adams did extensive background research on the RCMP before writing "S," which eventually got him involved in a long drawn-out court case. He and his publisher, Gage Publishing Ltd., were sued for libel by a former head of the RCMP SS, Leslie James Bennett. Bennett, who had to resign from the RCMP in 1972 after intensive interrogation and now lives in Australia, claims that the "S" in Adams' novel is modeled on himself and that the description is damaging to his reputation.

Immediately after Bennett announced his suit, Gage withdrew the book from the market even though sales had been going extremely well. Bennett demanded \$2.2 million in damages and a permanent injunction to stop distribution of the book. Bennett's libel suit constituted the first such case in Canada against a work of fiction. Adams refused to reveal the names of persons who had assisted him in researching the background to the novel, even after the Ontario Supreme Court ordered him to do so. Canadian writers quickly realized that this court order presented a serious threat to their rights. Organizations like the Association of Canadian Publishers and the Writers' Union of Canada strongly defended Adams' rights to protect his sources. The Union also established a Defense Fund to help Adams cover legal costs.

In December 1980, the Bennett suit was settled out of court. Gage paid \$30,000 to Bennett, and Adams allowed a note to be inserted in the book: "S is not Leslie James Bennett." The settlement, however, failed to explain why Bennett took Adams to court in the first place. An article in a recent issue of ThisMagazine throws some light on the case.

"S" was published at a time when the RCMP SS was under unprecedented attack for its illegal operations. It was clearly on the defensive, and "S" had the potential of further damaging the RCMP's image. A suit against Adams would divert the public attention from the revelations of RCMP crimes, and, therefore, was in the interest of the RCMP.

When "S" was published, Bennett was living in Perth, Australia. He was informed about the book by three letters from his friend Peter Worthington, a reactionary Canadian newspaper publisher and long-time RCMP collaborator (see box). In the first letter, dated November 14, 1977, Worthington told Bennett that he is the "S" in the novel and that he was identified on TV. Even though he hadn't seen the book yet, Worthington concluded that there "may be grounds for libel." Actually, the TV interview in which Bennett was "identified" was a pure invention by Worthington.

The second Worthington letter was even more direct: "If I were you I'd alert your lawyer - if you have one... I kind of believe... that if you don't defend your own

Peter Worthington's close relationship with the RCMP goes back to the early 1960s when he was the Moscow correspondent for the Toronto Telegram. In 1969 he served as an RCMP mouthpiece when Bennett, then a high-ranking RCMP SS officer, leaked him a story about activities of suspected Soviet agents in Canada. In 1971, Worthington became editor-in-chief of the Toronto Sun which he forged into a powerful rightwing tabloid by using a commercially successful formula of crime and sex stories and exploitative pictures of women. (In 1977, Worthington opened a similar tabloid in Edmonton, and in 1979 he took over the Calgary Albertan, which makes him one of the most powerful newspaper publishers in Canada.)

Following are two highlights of Peter Worthington's collaborative relationship with the RCMP: In December 1970, "persons unknown" broke into the office of Praxis Corporation (a community organization involved in issues like day care and tenants rights; at the time of the break-in, Praxis was organizing a national poor people's conference), stole carefully selected files, and then started a fire. The police were unable to solve this crime, but Worthington wrote on February 4, 1977 in the Toronto Sun that he had been given the stolen files two weeks after the break-in. Without informing Praxis, he had turned them over to the RCMP. After

Worthington's article, the RCMP was forced to return some of the files to Praxis, but refused to disclose its information about the original theft because "internal security would be threatened."

In another incident, in March 1978, Worthington wrote a column describing "sixteen separate incidents of Soviet espionage and attempted subversion" in Canada. His article was based on a "Top Secret" government report leaked to the Sun. Ian Adams of This Magazine - which printed the whole document two years later - concluded that even if it was a genuine RCMP paper, it contained at best "meagre sweepings of discarded information, structured and written in the style of RCMP manuals used at SS training courses..." But leaked to Worthington, and used in a sensationalistic article, it has "all the traditional earmarks of disinformation bait, designed to divert attention from the SS's real... domestic scandals and to remind Canadians of the RCMP's mythic struggle with Communism."

Printed at a time when the RCMP was under severe attack for its illegal operations, the Worthington column served several purposes: it drew attention away from the RCMP crimes being revealed; it brought back the Red Scare; and told the public "that an intelligence apparatus that could unveil such dastardly activities of the Soviets should be left well enough alone."

name, no one else will... If there is anything I can do - regardless of what the 'truth' is - let me know." Worthington outlined the story of the book to Bennett but he "makes it sound as though Bennett is a character in the novel. Yet Bennett is nowhere mentioned in the novel and up to this time no one had publicly linked Bennett to the character in the novel." (This Magazine, December 80)

In the third letter on November 19, 1977 Worthington told Bennett that he had already contacted a lawyer, and virtually asked Bennett to take Adams to court. Only one day after this letter, Bennett was identified publicly as "S" for the first time: by Peter Worthington in his paper, the Toronto Sun. Thus Worthington, the very person who had urged Bennett to sue Adams for libel was the one who publicly

identified Bennett as "S" for the first time. Bennett, whose information was based on the three Worthington letters, was unaware of this fact until the pre-trial examination long after he had filed suit.

Worthington's role in encouraging Bennett to sue makes him a key figure in this case. His past history as close RCMP collaborator and mouthpiece raises serious - and, so far, unanswered - questions about direct RCMP involvement in the libel suit.

# CIA and FBI: A New Executive Order

Reagan administration officials seemed annoyed when a draft of the proposed Executive Order (E.O.) on intelligence agencies was leaked to the media in early March 1981. CIA Deputy Director Bobby Inman told reporters assembled at CIA headquarters that the draft contained "all kinds of ideas." However, Inman acknowledged that a draft for a new E.O. on intelligence is being prepared in response to an explicit order from the White House in January 1981. "The new administration has read a great deal in the years out of office about the state of U.S. intelligence and, particularly questions about our current ability in regard to dealing with terrorism and the whole area of counterintelligence. Inman said the White House requested all intelligence agencies to assess "the impact of current restrictions" and the effect of these restrictions being lifted.

The intelligence working group which drafted the proposed E.O. is headed by CIA general counsel Daniel Silver - which suggests that at least one high ranking official is somewhat in agreement with the draft. Still, Inman emphasized that neither he nor CIA Director William Casey were involved in the drafting and that they were not "actively seeking" some of the changes in the order.

If signed by Reagan, the E.O. would give the CIA wide-ranging powers to use "intrusive" techniques (break-ins, etc.), and to conduct intelligence investigations directed at U.S. citizens and residents (in spite of the clear language of the 1947 National Security Act that the CIA "shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement powers, or internal security functions). The order would further allow the CIA to conduct physical surveillance operations in the U.S.; to obtain confidential records (e.g. tax returns); infiltrate U.S. organizations, and "affect the activities" (e.g. disruptions, smear campaigns) of organizations headed by foreigners or consisting of U.S. persons which are believed to be working "for or on behalf of a foreign organization or government," even if all the organization's activities are perfectly legal. In the administra-

tion's perception, that undoubtedly includes all progressive organizations and solidarity groups.

Several sections of the draft order are contrary even to the recommendations of the Rockefeller Commission which said that "Presidents should refrain from directing the CIA to perform what are essentially internal security tasks." Ronald Reagan was a member of the Commission and joined in this recommendation.

After considerable public outrage at the draft order, Inman and other administration officials including White House counselor Edwin Meese were quick to assert that "the White House is absolutely opposed to the CIA becoming involved in domestic spying." Meese also dismissed the importance of the draft order. However, both Inman and Meese acknowledged that "Reagan soon will issue an executive order meant to improve the CIA's ability to gather intelligence abroad," and Inman added that "some new measures would probably be necessary to control the threat of terrorism." While he maintained that the new E.O. (which will replace Carter's E.O. 12036, signed on January 24, 1978) will not give the CIA greater authority at home, Inman had to acknowledge that "various intelligence agencies" had told him that "legal restrictions on domestic spying and very intrusive techniques" diminished the agencies' capabilities. (It should be recalled that Inman headed the National Security Agency before he was appointed CIA Deputy Director by Reagan. The NSA illegally monitors almost all long-distance telecommunications of U.S. citizens.)

Even if the administration were to back away from plans to increase the CIA's domestic power, there are a number of other provisions in the draft order that would bring this country several steps closer to being a Police State. The FBI would be allowed to investigate and "affect the activities" of organizations which may be acting for a foreign power or "engaging in international terrorist activity." Under this clause, the FBI's investigation of political groups could be conducted simply on the basis of an ideological evaluation



of an organization by the White House. And given the far-right ideology of the administration, that could, for example, even subject the Catholic Bishops to COINTELPRO type harassment for their opposition to U.S. military intervention in El Salvador.

The draft order and the actual E.O. Reagan will sign do not come in a vacuum. It is only natural that an administration which is trying to expand its military power abroad and is extremely hostile to liberation movements will have to crack down on dissent in the U.S. Already, opposition to Reagan's economic policies of aiding the rich and taking from the poor, and his interventionist policy abroad are encountering increasing opposition in the U.S. Reagan wants to prepare for it by giving more power to the intelligence agencies and stepping up surveillance and repression. Whether or not he will be successful is in the hands of the people.

#### EXECUTIVE ORDER \_\_\_\_\_

#### STANDARDS FOR THE CONDUCT OF UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, including the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and as President of the United States of America, in order to provide for the effective conduct of United States intelligence activities and the protection of constitutional rights, it is hereby ordered as follows:

#### Section 1

1-1. Amendment of Section 2 of Executive Order 12036.

1-101. Executive Order 12036 is hereby amended by deleting section 2 entitled "Restriction on Intelligence Activities" and inserting in lieu thereof:

"Section 2.

"CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

"2-1. General

"2-101. Purpose. Information about the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons

is essential to informed decision-making in the areas of national defense and foreign relations. The measures employed to acquire such information should be responsive to legitimate governmental needs and be conducted in a manner that respects established concepts of privacy and civil liberties.

"2-102. Principles of Interpretation. Sections 2-201 through 2-309 set forth governing principles which, in addition to other applicable laws, are intended to achieve the proper balance between protection of individual interests and acquisition of essential information. Those sections govern the conduct of specific activities within the Intelligence Community. Those sections shall not be construed as affecting or restricting other lawful activities of intelligence components not otherwise addressed therein. Nothing in this Order shall affect the law enforcement responsibilities of any department or agency. Any collection activity conducted for a law enforcement purpose may be handled in accordance with relevant law enforcement procedures, as appropriate.

"2.2. Use of Certain Collection Techniques.

"2-201. General Provisions.

(a) The activities described in sections 2-202 through 2-207 shall be undertaken in accordance with this Order and procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and determined by the Attorney General not to violate the constitution or statutes of the United States. Those procedures shall protect constitutional rights, limit use of such information to lawful governmental purposes and, to the extent consistent with the intelligence needs of the United States, accommodate privacy. No agency head shall establish any procedure which the Attorney General determines to be unlawful under the Constitution or statutes of the United States.

(b) The Attorney General hereby is delegated the power to approve the use, for intelligence purposes, of any technique for which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes, provided that such activities shall not be undertaken in the United States or against a United States person abroad without a

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judicial warrant, unless the Attorney General has determined that under the circumstances the activity is lawful under the Constitution and statutes of the United States. The Attorney General may approve the use of such techniques by category or delegate authority to the head of any agency within the Intelligence Community to approve the use of such techniques in accordance with procedures approved by the Attorney General.

"2-202. Electronic Surveillance. An agency within the Intelligence Community may engage in electronic surveillance directed against a United States person abroad or designed to intercept a communication sent from, or intended for receipt within, the United States, but only in accordance with procedures established pursuant to section 2-201. Any electronic surveillance, as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, shall be conducted in accordance with that Act as well as this Order. The CIA may engage in electronic surveillance activity within the United States only for the purpose of assisting, and in coordination with, another agency within the Intelligence Community authorized to conduct such electronic surveillance, but this prohibition shall not apply to the activities described in the remainder of this paragraph. Training of personnel by agencies within the Intelligence Community in the use of electronic surveillance equipment, testing by such agencies of such equipment, and the use of measures to determine the existence and capability of such surveillance equipment being used unlawfully shall not be prohibited and shall also be governed by such procedures. Such activities shall be limited in scope and duration to those necessary to carry out the training, testing or countermeasures purpose, provided that intelligence information derived during the training of personnel or the testing of electronic surveillance equipment may be disseminated in accordance with procedures developed pursuant to section 2-207.

"2-203. Physical Searches. Any unsent physical search within the United States by an agency within the Intelligence Community shall be coordinated with the FBI. All such searches, including those conducted by the FBI, as well as all such searches conducted by any agency

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within the Intelligence Community outside the United States and directed against United States persons, shall be undertaken only as permitted by procedures established pursuant to section 2-201.

"2-204. Mail Surveillance. No agency within the Intelligence Community shall open mail or examine envelopes in United States postal channels, except in accordance with applicable statutes and regulations. No agency within the Intelligence Community shall open mail of a United States person that is outside U.S. postal channels except as permitted by procedures established pursuant to section 2-201.

"2-205. Physical Surveillance. The FBI may conduct physical surveillance (including the use of monitoring devices for which a warrant would not be required for law enforcement purposes) directed against United States persons or others in the course of a lawful investigation. Other agencies within the Intelligence Community may undertake physical surveillance (including the use of monitoring devices for which a warrant would not be required for law enforcement purposes) directed against a United States person if:

(a) The surveillance is conducted outside the United States in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, international narcotics or international terrorism investigation;

(b) That person is being surveilled for the purpose of protecting foreign intelligence and counterintelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure or is the subject of a lawful counterintelligence or personal, physical or communications security investigation; or

(c) The surveillance is conducted solely for the purpose of identifying a person who is in contact with someone described in subsection (a) or (b) of this section.

Surveillance in the United States shall be coordinated with the FBI if directed at a person other than a present employee, intelligence agency contractor or employee of such contractor, or a military person employed by a non-intelligence element of a military service.

"2-206. Undisclosed Participation in Domestic Organizations. In accordance with procedures established under section

2-201, employees of agencies within the Intelligence Community may join, or otherwise participate in an organization within the United States on behalf of an agency within the Intelligence Community for any lawful purpose without disclosing their intelligence affiliation to appropriate officials of the organization, provided:

(a) Participation by any agency other than the FBI for purposes of acquiring information about the organization or any United States person who is a member thereof is strictly limited in its nature, scope and duration to a lawful purpose related to foreign intelligence and nondisclosure is necessary to achieve that purpose; and

(b) Participation by the CIA for purposes of affecting the activities of the organization is limited to attaining legitimate foreign intelligence objectives when the appropriate officials to whom disclosure normally would be made are foreign nationals or the organization involved is owned or controlled by a foreign organization or government or is working for or on behalf of a foreign organization or government and such participation is conducted in a manner that provides due protection for constitutional rights.

"2-207. Collection of Nonpublicly Available Information. An agency within the Intelligence Community may collect, retain in files on identifiable United States persons, or disseminate information for intelligence or counterintelligence purposes concerning the activities of United States persons that is not available publicly, only if it does so with their consent or as permitted by procedures established pursuant to section 2-201. Those procedures shall limit collection, retention in files on identifiable United States persons, and dissemination to the following types of information:

(a) Information concerning corporations or other commercial organizations or activities that constitutes foreign intelligence or counterintelligence;

(b) Information arising out of a lawful counterintelligence or personnel, physical or communications security investigation;

(c) Information concerning persons, derived from any lawful investigation,

which is needed to protect foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods from unauthorized disclosure;

(d) Information needed solely to identify individuals in contact with those persons described in paragraph (c) of this section or in contact with someone who is the subject of a lawful foreign intelligence or counterintelligence investigation;

(e) Information concerning persons who are reasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts, but only for the purpose of determining the suitability or credibility of such persons;

(f) Information constituting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence gathered abroad or from electronic surveillance conducted in compliance with section 2-202 or gathered by lawful means in the United States;

(g) Information about a person who has acted or may be acting on behalf of a foreign power, has engaged or may be engaging in international terrorist or narcotics activities, or has endangered the safety of any person protected by the United States Secret Service or the Department of State, or may be endangering the safety of any person;

(h) Information acquired by overhead reconnaissance not directed at specific United States persons;

(i) Information concerning United States persons abroad that is obtained in response to requests from the Department of State for support of its consular responsibilities relating to the welfare of those persons;

(j) Information collected, received, disseminated or stored by the FBI and necessary to fulfil its lawful investigative responsibilities; or

(k) Information concerning persons or activities that pose a credible threat to any facility or personnel of any agency within the Intelligence Community or any department containing such an agency.

In addition, those procedures shall permit an agency within the Intelligence Community to disseminate information, other than information derived from signals intelligence, to another agency within the

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Intelligence Community for purposes of allowing the recipient agency to determine whether the information is relevant to its lawful responsibilities and can be retained by it.

### "2.3. Additional Principles.

"2-301. Tax Information. Agencies within the Intelligence Community may examine tax returns or tax information only as permitted by applicable law.

"2-302. Human Experimentation. No agency within the Intelligence Community shall sponsor, contract for, or conduct research on human subjects except in accordance with guidelines issued by the Department of Health and Human Services. The subject's informed consent shall be documented as required by those guidelines.

"2-303. Contracting. No agency within the Intelligence Community shall enter into a contract or arrangement for the provision of goods or services with private companies or institutions in the United States unless the agency sponsorship is known to the appropriate officials of the company or institution. In the case of any company or institution other than an academic institution, intelligence agency sponsorship may be concealed where it is determined, pursuant to procedures approved by the agency head, that such concealment is necessary for authorized intelligence purposes.

"2-304. Personnel Assigned to Other Agencies. An employee detailed to another agency within the federal government shall be responsible to the host agency and shall not report to the parent agency on the affairs of the host agency unless so directed by the host agency. The head of the host agency, and any successor, shall be informed of the employee's relationship with the parent agency.

"2-305. Prohibition on Assassinations. No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.

"2-306. Special Activities. No component of the United States Government except an agency within the Intelligence Community may conduct any special activity. No such agency except the CIA (or the military services in wartime) may conduct

any special activity unless the President determines, with the SCC's advice, that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular objective.

"2-307. Restrictions on Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities. Agencies within the Intelligence Community other than the FBI shall not, except as expressly authorized by law or section 2-308:

(a) Provide services, equipment, personnel or facilities to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (or its successor agencies) or to state or local police organizations of the United States; or

(b) Participate in or fund any law enforcement activity within the United States.

"2-308. Permissible Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities. The restrictions in section 2-307 shall not preclude:

(a) Cooperation with appropriate law enforcement agencies for the purpose of protecting the personnel, information and facilities of any agency within the Intelligence Community;

(b) Participation in law enforcement activities in accordance with law and this Order, to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers, or international terrorist or narcotics activities; or

(c) Provision of specialized equipment, technical knowledge, or assistance of expert personnel for use by any department or agency or, when lives are endangered, to support local law enforcement agencies.

"2-309. Permissible Dissemination and Storage of Information. Nothing in sections 2-201 through 2-308 of this Order shall prohibit:

(a) Dissemination to appropriate law enforcement agencies of information which may indicate involvement in activities that may violate federal, state or foreign laws;

(b) Storage of information required by law to be retained;

(c) Dissemination of information covered by section 2-207 to agencies within the Intelligence Community or entities of co-operating foreign governments; or

(d) Lawful storage or dissemination of

information for administrative purposes." 4-209(c).

## Section 2

### 2-1. Miscellaneous Amendments.

2-101. Section 1-706 of Executive Order 12036 is amended to read as follows:

"Each agency within the Intelligence Community shall furnish to the FBI and to Federal law enforcement agencies information needed by such agencies in the performance of their duties, in accordance with procedures agreed to by the heads of both of the departments or agencies concerned."

2-102. Section 1-801 of Executive Order 12036 is amended by deleting the words "Attorney General" and substituting therefore the words "Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

2-103. Section 1-805 of Executive Order 12036 is amended by deleting the words after "FBI" and substituting the words "pursuant to procedures agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

2-104. Sections 3-305 of Executive Order 12036 is amended to read as follows:

"Determine, as required by this Order, that procedures established by the heads of agencies within the Intelligence Community are consistent with the Constitution and statutes of the United States."

2-105. Section 4-105 is amended to read as follows:

"Until the procedures required by amendments to this Order have been established, the activities authorized and regulated herein shall be conducted in accordance with procedures heretofore approved or agreed to by the Attorney General pursuant to this Order. Procedures required by amendments to this Order shall be established as expeditiously as possible."

2-106. Section 4-202 of Executive Order 12036 is amended by adding a comma after "espionage," deleting the word "and" after "espionage," and by deleting the word "clandestine."

2-107. Section 4-209 of Executive Order 12036 is amended by inserting the words "occurs in a foreign country or" before the word "transcends" in subsection

2-108. Section 4-212 of Executive Order 12036 is amended by deleting the words "conducted abroad" after "activities."

2-109. Section 4-214 of Executive Order 12036 is amended to read as follows:

"United States person means a citizen of the United States, an alien physically present in the United States who is known by the intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincorporated association substantially composed of United States citizens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States, unless such corporation is controlled by one or more foreign powers, persons or organizations."

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